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Preface
”Les e´toiles sont belles, a` cause d’une fleur que l’on ne voit pas...”
- Le Petit Prince, Antoine de Saint-Exupe´ry.
Quantum mechanics is one of the most intriguing subjects to study. The world works
inherently differently on very small scales and can no longer be described by means
of classical physics corresponding to our everyday intuition. Contrary to classical
computing, quantum computation is based on the rules of quantum mechanics. It
not only allows for more efficient local computations, but also has far-reaching effects
on multi-party protocols. In this thesis, we investigate two cryptographic primitives
for privacy protection using quantum computing: private information retrieval and
anonymous transmissions.
The goal of private information retrieval (PIR) is to allow a user to retrieve any
item from a database while preventing the database from learning the index of the
requested entry. One simple solution would be to send the entire database to the
user, who can then select the desired entry. This ensures that the database surely
cannot learn anything. However, this approach is clearly not very practical. Imagine,
for example, that for looking up the arrival time of flight in a database you would
have to download all flight records of the world. Can we do better than sending the
entire database? The main question of private information retrieval is thus: What
is the minimum number of bits we really need to retrieve the database record and
ensure the privacy of the user? Or, in other words, what is the lower bound for
the communication complexity of PIR? Here we prove new lower bounds for the
communication complexity of unconditionally secure classical private information
retrieval using a novel quantum trick. Our result implies that several known PIR
schemes are close to optimal. Closely related to the problem of private information
retrieval are locally decodable codes (LDC). These are error-correcting codes that
allow efficient decoding of individual bits of the encoded data from the codeword,
without having to read all of it. Thus we can make a small number of queries to
the codeword, which will each give us part of this codeword. We then combine all
these parts to reconstruct pieces of the encoded data. This is particularly useful in
applications where we wish to encode a large chunk of data, but are only interested
in extracting small pieces at a time, for example, we want to encode an entire book,
but want to retrieve only a single page. The main question here is: How large does
v
the codeword have to be so that we still stand a chance of reconstructing the piece of
data we are interested in? We show new lower bounds for the code length of 2-query
LDCs. Our results generalize those of Goldreich et al. [47], who proved roughly the
same bounds for only linear LDCs and PIRs. Like earlier work by Kerenidis and
de Wolf [53], our classical lower bounds are proved using quantum computational
techniques. The new trick used here is a tight analysis of how well a 2-input function
can be computed from a quantum superposition of both inputs. Thus starting out
with a quantum state |0, a0〉+ |1, a1〉, what are our chances of computing f(a0, a1)?
We also study the problem of anonymous transmissions. In this setting, members
of a group of participants want to send and receive data, without revealing their
identity to any other participant or to an outside observer. We present a quantum
protocol for sending and receiving classical bits anonymously that is resistant to
collusions of participants and, unlike all known classical protocols, prevents later
reconstruction of the sender. It appears that entangled quantum states are uniquely
suited for anonymous transmissions. We then extend this protocol to provide sender
and recipient untraceability for qubits as well. In the process we also introduce
a new primitive called anonymous entanglement, which may be useful for many
other protocols as well. Our protocol furthermore provides an example where O(n2)
pairwise private shared random bits can be replaced by an n-qubit shared entangled
state. This is an interesting tradeoff, as the n-qubit entangled state is equally shared
by everyone, whereas each classical random bit is known to only two participants.
Outline
Chapter 1 gives an informal introduction to quantum computation. Read Ap-
pendix A for an overview of linear algebra used in quantum computing. In Chapter 2
you can find the basic cryptographic terminology, as far as it is necessary to follow
the remainder of this text. Part I is concerned entirely with private information
retrieval and locally decodable codes. Chapter 3 explains the notion of private in-
formation retrieval and gives a number of example protocols to aid your intuition.
It also gives the known lower and upper bounds for PIR. Chapter 4 then gives an
introduction to locally decodable codes together with two examples. Known lower
bounds can also be found in this chapter. The main part of Part I is Chapter 5,
where we prove new lower bounds for both private information retrieval and locally
decodable codes. Part II deals with the problem of anonymous transmissions. In
Chapter 6 you can find an overview of the problem together with the description of
a known classical protocol. Finally, Chapter 7 presents a new quantum protocol for
anonymously transmitting classical and quantum bits.
Personal Motivation
When I finished the class of Harry Buhrman two years ago, I decided that I wanted
to do my final year project on a topic in the area of quantum computing. Since then
I have tried to learn more about the subject of quantum mechanics by following
several physics classes, which proved to be extremely interesting. Luckily, I had the
opportunity to work at CWI, where I could see how people are conducting research
in this area. Ronald de Wolf introduced me to the problem of private information
retrieval and helped me work on this topic. Many of our initial approaches to PIR
turned out to be flawed and several months were turned into a cycle of excitement
and disappointment. This was a great learning experience for me and gave me a
peek at what it is like to step outside the borders of our existing knowledge.
I am very happy I found a topic which combined my interest in quantum com-
puting and my other long term interest of security. After quitting my job in the area
of practical computer security last year, I had initially decided to say good bye to
security problems, for the second time in my life. Nevertheless, I keep gravitating
back to security issues. In the area of computing I was always particularly fond
of distributed computation and protocols involving multiple participants. Not only
does this setting generate many concurrency problems, it also creates interesting
scenarios if some of the participants decide not to follow the protocol. Multi-player
protocols are much like games, which seem to become a lot more interesting once
some of the players turn into adversaries and try to “win” or defeat the underlying
protocol.
Frankly, I have to confess that I just greatly enjoyed working on the problems in
this text.
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Chapter 1
Quantum Computing
1.1 Introduction
Quantum computing is based on quantum physics, which describes how the world
works on very small scales. This contrasts with classical forms of computation, which
both in theory and implementation are based on classical physics alone.
In the following we give an overview of quantum computing required for the
remainder of this text. We first take a brief look at the history of quantum com-
putation. We then review the quantum mechanical principles underlying quantum
computation. Finally, we show how to construct quantum circuits to perform com-
putations on quantum states.
1.2 History
In the early 1980’s Richard Feynman considered the question of simulating quantum
mechanical systems, which appears to be extremely difficult using classical comput-
ing models. In particular, he raised the question whether a computer based on the
principles of quantum mechanics could perform better at such simulations. This
marks the advent of the new field of Quantum Computation, which has sparked off
considerable interest since. In the mid-eighties David Deutsch went on to develop
a digital variant [37]. A plethora of quantum algorithms has been discovered since
then, which illustrate the power of this new computing model [65]. The most well
known is Peter Shor’s algorithm for factoring integers presented in 1994 [74]. This
was significant, since factoring is one of the problems considered hard in classical
computing and the security of many encryption techniques, such as RSA, rests on
this assumption. Once large scale quantum computers are built, these cryptographic
systems no longer protect against adversaries. However, Wiesner [85] (1970), and
Bennett and Brassard [20] (1984) introduced quantum cryptography which does not
depend on factoring. Quantum cryptography differs from conventional cryptogra-
phy in that quantum states are used to exchange secret keys securely. Later on,
Lov Grover [48] showed how to find an element in an unsorted list of size N in time
proportional to
√
N , which is better than any classical algorithm.
1
2 Quantum Computing
Whereas quantum cryptography is already available commercially [80], large
scale quantum computers have yet to be built. So far the largest quantum com-
puter constructed in a lab can only work with 7 qubits [34]. Creating large scale
quantum computers confronts researchers with many similar problems as were en-
countered when classical computing machines were first developed: noise-reduction
and error-correction. Physical implementation of quantum computers is a very ac-
tive field of research. However, it may still take decades before all complications can
be overcome. Nevertheless other applications such as quantum cryptography, which
do not require a full-blown quantum computer may be possible much earlier.
1.3 Quantum Mechanics
Contrary to classical computing we perform computations using quantum states,
which have some very intriguing properties, as we will discover shortly. In this section
we require some linear algebra, the essentials of which are explained in Appendix A.
1.3.1 States
A quantum state can be described by a state vector living in a complex vector
space, also called the state space. Such a complex vector space with inner product is
called a Hilbert space. We will first examine the basic building block, the quantum
bit or qubit, and how these are combined. We then take a look at the concept of
superpositions. As it turns out, a qubit can be in several classical states all at once!
Qubits
The simplest conceivable quantum state is a single qubit . A qubit has a two-
dimensional state space, whose orthonormal basis is generally denoted as {|0〉, |1〉}.
These two basis states can be written as vectors
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
.
In the course of this text, we will refer to this as the computational basis in two
dimensions. We can now use this idea to write any arbitrary qubit as a vector in
this state space, given by
|Ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 =
(
α
β
)
where α and β are complex numbers. State vectors are required to be unit vectors.
This means that they are normalized , that is ‖ |Ψ〉 ‖ = 1 or equivalently |α|2+|β|2 =
1. Intuitively, α and β give an indication of “how much” of |0〉 and |1〉 is found in
|Ψ〉.
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We can now combine such individual qubits to higher dimensional quantum
states. Two quantum mechanical systems are combined using the tensor product .
For example we can write a system of two qubits |Ψ〉 = α1|0〉 + α2|1〉 and |Φ〉 =
β1|0〉+ β2|1〉 as
|Ψ〉 ⊗ |Φ〉 =
(
α1
α2
)
⊗
(
β1
β2
)
=


α1β1
α1β2
α2β1
α2β2


Instead of |Ψ〉 ⊗ |Φ〉, we will also use the shorthand notations |Φ〉|Ψ〉 and |Φ,Ψ〉.
Formally the state |Ψ〉|Φ〉 is called a product state. As a simple example consider
the 2 qubit state
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 =
(
1
0
)
⊗
(
1
0
)
=


1
0
0
0

 .
Note that not all states in the same state space can be written as the product
of two individual states. As we will discover shortly, states which can not be de-
composed this way play an important role in quantum computing and are called
entangled states.
In general, we can write any d-dimensional quantum state as a vector in Cd.
Here we will make use of the Dirac notation to write
|Ψ〉 =
d∑
i=1
αi|ψi〉 =


α1
α2
...
αd


A vector written in the form |·〉 is called a ket . Its so-called dual, 〈Ψ|, is defined as
the conjugate transpose of |Ψ〉. This way of writing a vector is referred to as bra.
Together they form the bra(c)ket 〈Ψ|Ψ〉. This denotes the inner product between
two state vectors |Ψ〉 and |Φ〉 given by 〈Ψ|Φ〉.
It becomes clear that n qubits can have a state space of dimension C2n , which
means the state space grows exponentially with the number of qubits.
Superposition
As we already noticed, a qubit can be in a linear combination of classical states
given by the basis vectors. We call such a linear combination of basis states a
superposition. So
α|0〉+ β|1〉
is a superposition of |0〉 and |1〉. Intuitively, this means that a qubit can be both |0〉
and |1〉 at the same time! Not only single qubits can be a superposition of states.
4 Quantum Computing
An n-qubit state lives in a d = 2n-dimensional vector space with orthonormal basis
{|ψ1〉, . . . , |ψd〉}. We call any linear combination of basis states |ψi〉,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
αi|ψi〉,
a superposition of states with amplitude αi for the state |ψi〉. For example the state
|00〉 − |11〉√
2
is a superposition of the states |00〉 and |11〉 with amplitude 1/√2 for state |00〉, and
amplitude −1/√2 for |11〉.
From the last example, we see that amplitudes can also be negative. Amplitudes
only correspond to probabilities of measuring the corresponding state if we square
them. In fact, these negative amplitudes are responsible for interference effects,
which play an important role in quantum computing.
Phase
The phase of a state is an important characteristic of quantum mechanics. In general,
we distinguish between global and relative phase. Let |Ψ〉 be any state vector and
let θ denote a real number. We say that eiθ|Ψ〉 is equal to |Ψ〉 up to a global phase
factor. Looking at how we define measurement below, we immediately see that
this global phase cancels out during measurement. Since it has no influence on the
measurement result, we say that a global phase has no observable consequence.
On the other hand, we call eiθ in α|0〉 + eiθβ|1〉 a relative phase. Thus we can
have a different phase associated with each amplitude. This makes a relative phase
basis dependent. Unlike the global phase, a relative phase does have observable
consequences, which will become important later on.
1.3.2 Measurement
As already indicated, we have the option to measure such a quantum state. What
exactly does this mean? And in particular, if we could determine the amplitudes α
and β exactly couldn’t a single qubit contain an infinite amount of information?
Measurements in the computational basis
Suppose we measure the single qubit state |Ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 in the computational
basis. We cannot perceive the superposition as such, but will only observe outcomes
|0〉 or |1〉. When measuring |Ψ〉 we obtain |0〉 with probability |α|2 and |1〉 with
probability |β|2. We also refer to α and β as probability amplitudes. Thus there
are only two outcomes of the measurement and we cannot determine α and β itself.
Therefore the amount of information we can encode in a qubit is not infinite, as one
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may think initially. Generally if we speak of measurement, we refer to a measurement
in the computational basis unless indicated otherwise.
In general, measuring the state
∑
x∈{0,1}n αx|x〉 in the computational basis gives
|x〉 with probability |αx|2. Thus measurement of such a quantum state induces a
probability distribution on the classical states x ∈ {0, 1}n.
An essential aspect of measurements in quantum mechanics is that they affect
the state. Measuring α|0〉 + β|1〉 in the computational basis will collapse it to one
of the basis states |0〉 and |1〉. This means that if we measure again immediately
afterwards, we will obtain the same result: the superposition no longer exists.
General measurements
In this text, we will need more refined measurements. In general, measurements in
quantum mechanics are described by a collection of measurement operators {Mm}.
The index m refers to the measurement outcome. These operators can be described
by matrices and act on the state space of the system we want to observe. If the
system is in the state |Ψ〉 right before our measurement, then the probability of
measuring outcome m is given by
p(m) = 〈Ψ|M †mMm|Ψ〉.
After the measurement, the state will have collapsed to
Mm|Ψ〉√
p(m)
.
The measurement operators should satisfy the completeness relation
∑
mM
†
mMm =
I, where I denotes the identity matrix. This reflects the requirement that the sum
of all probabilities p(m) should sum to 1, that is
∑
m p(m) = 1.
To get a feel for this formalism, consider the measurement of a single qubit
in the computational basis. We can describe such a measurement by operators
M0 = |0〉〈0| and M1 = |1〉〈1|. We have M †0M0 +M †1M1 =M0 +M1 = I. Measuring
|Ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 now gives outcome |0〉 with probability
p(0) = 〈Ψ|M †0M0|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|M0|Ψ〉 =
= (α∗〈0|+ β∗〈1|)|0〉〈0|(α|0〉+ β|1〉) = |α|2〈0|0〉
= |α|2
as expected. We also see that the state after the measurement with outcome 0 is
given by
M0|Ψ〉
|α| =
α
|α| |0〉.
We can ignore the global α/|α|, so the post-measurement state is indeed |0〉.
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Projective measurements
Projective measurements are a special case of general measurements, which we will
make use of later. In contrast to general measurements, a projective measurement
follows the additional requirement that the operatorsMm are orthogonal projectors.
This means that all Mm are Hermitian and MmM
′
m = δm,m′Mm. Note that the
operators M0 and M1 we used earlier to describe our measurement in the computa-
tional basis already satisfy this constraint, and can thus also be seen as a projective
measurement.
In general, projective measurements are described by an observable, M , which is
an Hermitian operator on the state space we wish to observe. This observable has a
spectral decompositionM =
∑
mmPm, where Pm is a projector onto the eigenspace
ofM with eigenvaluem. This may sound rather complicated, however, note that the
possible measurement outcomes are simply the eigenvalues of M . The probability
of observing m is then given by
p(m) = 〈Ψ|Pm|Ψ〉
and the state right after the measurement is
Pm|Ψ〉√
p(m)
.
For example we can choose P0 = |0〉〈0| and P1 = |1〉〈1| to perform a measurement
in the computational basis.
An important fact, which will we need in a later chapter, is that it is possible to
perform partial measurements on a state. Consider for example the state
|Φ〉 = 1√
3
|0〉 ⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) +
√
2
3
|1〉 ⊗ |10〉.
We now want to measure only the first qubit, by applying measurement operators
P0 = |0〉〈0|⊗ I⊗2 and P1 = |1〉〈1|⊗ I⊗2. The ⊗I⊗2 just means we will do nothing to
the last 2 qubits. Using the above definition this gives us outcome 0 with probability
p(0) = 〈Φ|P0|Φ〉 = 1/3 and 1 with p(1) = 〈Φ|P1|Φ〉 = 2/3 respectively. If we measure
0, the state of the system collapses to
P0|Φ〉√
1
3
= |0〉 ⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
However if we measure 1, the post-measurement state will be
P1|Φ〉√
2
3
= |1〉 ⊗ |10〉.
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Distinguishing Quantum States
From these definitions it is also apparent that we can distinguish two quantum
states which are orthogonal to each other, as we can then simply choose them as
our measurement basis. How about non-orthogonal states? It turns out that if |Ψ〉
and |Φ〉 are non-orthogonal, there is no quantum measurement capable of perfectly
distinguishing these two states. To see informally why this is true consider some
measurement operator Mj with outcome j. Depending on the measurement out-
come, we will decide whether the state was |Ψ〉 or |Φ〉 according to a certain rule.
For example, we use the rule that if we measure j, the state was |Ψ〉. Note that
since the two states are non-orthogonal we can decompose |Φ〉 = γ|Ψ〉 + η|φ〉 into
a non-zero component parallel to |Ψ〉, and a component |φ〉, which is orthogonal to
|Ψ〉. Due to this non-zero parallel component, there is a non-zero probability of ob-
taining measurement outcome j when measuring |Φ〉. But then we will erroneously
conclude that the state was |Ψ〉. Thus we cannot distinguish two non-orthogonal
states with perfect accuracy.
This is all we will need in this thesis concerning quantum measurements. More
in depth information can be found in the book of Nielsen and Chuang [65][Section
2.2.3].
1.3.3 Evolution
Now that we looked at measurements, what else can we do with a quantum state?
In particular, how could we perform any operations on a qubit before measuring?
Quantum mechanical systems undergo an evolution over time. We can describe
the evolution of a closed quantum system by a unitary transformation. That is, the
state |Ψ〉 = (α1, . . . , αd)T of the system at time t1 is related to the state |Ψ′〉 =
(β1, . . . , βd)
T at time t2 by a unitary operator U such that
 β1...
βd

 = U

 α1...
αd

 .
U can thus be seen as an d× d complex valued matrix. Since we want all states to
stay normalized, we need
∑d
i=1 |βi|2 = 1. This condition is satisfied by requiring U
to be a unitary transformation. This just means that the inverse U−1 of U needs
to be equal to its conjugate transpose U †. We thus see that unitary operations are
norm preserving. Finally, we have U †U = U−1U = I, thus if we apply U−1 to
U |Ψ〉, we move back to the original state. This means that quantum operations are
reversible. Only measurement operations violate this principle, as we saw earlier.
This again contrasts with classical computing. Consider for example the classical
OR operation, which maps inputs 1, 0 and 1, 1 both to the same output state 1.
Clearly this operation is not reversible.
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How is this useful for quantum computing? We can perform operations on qubits,
by bringing about a certain time evolution. Thus we operate on qubits by choosing
a certain unitary operation U .
1.3.4 Entanglement
Before we can turn to construct quantum circuits, we need to look at what is perhaps
the most intriguing property of quantum mechanics. As mentioned earlier, not
every higher dimensional quantum system is a product state and can be decomposed
into the product of several lower dimensional systems. We call states entangled , if
they are not product states. Entangled states play a fundamental role in quantum
computing. Consider for example the state
|00〉+ |11〉√
2
.
It is intuitively clear that we cannot decompose this state into two states |Ψ〉 and
|Φ〉. If we try to write down such a decomposition
|Ψ〉 ⊗ |Φ〉 = (α1|0〉+ α2|1〉)⊗ (β1|0〉+ β2|1〉)
= α1β1|00〉+ α1β2|01〉+ α2β1|10〉+ α2β2|11〉
= (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2
we see right away that we cannot pick α1, α2, β1, β2 such that α1β2 = α2β1 = 0 and
α1β1 = α2β2 = 1/
√
2 simultaneously.
The state above is commonly referred to as an EPR pair, after Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen who tried to use it to prove Quantum Mechanics incomplete. It has some
very peculiar properties. Suppose for example we take the first qubit of the state
above and give it to Alice. Similarly, we take the second one and hand it to Bob.
Alice now visits the newly established colony on the moon, taking her qubit along.
At some point she measures her qubit in the computational basis, which will give
her outcomes |0〉 or |1〉 with equal probability. However, since the two qubits are
entangled, this will collapse the total state to either |00〉 or |11〉. This means that, if
Bob measures his qubit right afterwards, his outcome is completely determined by
Alice’s measurement result. It is as if “information” has been transmitted instan-
taneously from Alice to Bob! Thus entanglement allows for non-local interactions.
Note that the outcome is not fixed before the measurement unlike in the case of
classical randomness where Alice and Bob share the outcome of a coin flip.
This intuitively strange property of entangled states makes them a fundamentally
new resource which plays a central role in quantum computing. Especially in multi-
party cryptographic protocols, entanglement can open up interesting possibilities,
as we will see later.
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1.3.5 Density Matrix Formalism
Above we have formulated quantum states as vectors. An alternative formulation,
which we will need, is provided by the density matrix . This way of abstraction is
sometimes more convenient.
First of all, we need two definitions. A quantum system described by a unit
vector as a superposition of basis states is called a pure state. If this is not the case,
we say that the system is in a mixed state. Suppose now that a quantum system
is in a number of possible pure state |ψi〉, with respective probabilities pi. The set
{pi, |ψi〉}, is called an ensemble of pure states. The density operator is then defined
as
ρ =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|.
This is also called the density matrix. Measurements and unitary evolution can be
rephrased in terms of the density operator. Since we will not require this in this
text, we refer to the book by Nielsen and Chuang [65] for more information. We only
note that a pure state will satisfy tr(ρ2) = 1, whereas for a mixed state tr(ρ2) < 1.
tr is the trace operation, with tr(|a1〉〈a2|) = 〈a1|a2〉. Furthermore it is important
to realize that multiple different ensembles of quantum states may give rise to the
same density matrix.
An important tool we will use is the so-called reduced density matrix. This be-
comes especially useful when analyzing multi-party protocols where different parties
share part of an entangled state. The reduced density matrix lets us determine the
state of a sub-system of a larger quantum system. Suppose we have two physical
systems A and B, whose common state is described by a density operator ρAB. The
reduced density operator for A is then defined as
ρA = trB(ρ
AB),
where trB is called the partial trace over system B. This is a linear operator defined
by
trB(|a1〉〈a2| ⊗ |b1〉〈b2|) = |a1〉〈a2|tr(|b1〉〈b2|),
where |a1〉, |a2〉 are any two vectors in the state space of A and |b1〉,|b2〉 any two
vectors in the state space of B.
As an example, let’s analyze the EPR pair shared by Alice and Bob above. This
is a pure state, and we can calculate the density matrix ρ as
ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| = 1
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)(〈00|+ 〈11|)
=
1
2
(|00〉〈00|+ |00〉〈11|+ |11〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)
If Alice has only the first qubit in her possession, how can we describe her state?
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We can trace out Bob’s part to obtain
ρA = trB(ρ)
=
1
2
(trB(|00〉〈00|) + trB(|00〉〈11|) + trB(|11〉〈00|) + trB(|11〉〈11|))
=
1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)
=
I
2
We see that Alice’s state is a mixed state, since tr((I/2)2) = 1/2 < 1. Intuitively
this means that this is a state that is not known completely to Alice. Observe
that starting out with (|00〉−|11〉)/√2 instead, would give the same reduced density
matrix for Alice. We can conclude from this, that without any additional information
Alice cannot distinguish these two possibilities given her qubit alone.
1.4 Quantum Computation
Similarly to how a classical computer can be modeled as a circuit consisting of wires
and classical logic gates [67], a quantum computer can be described as a quantum
circuit with the help of quantum gates. Note that if we talk about wires, we refer to
a connection within the model, not to the physical implementation. Just as classical
bits are not only represented by signals traveling over electrical wires, we can have
qubits implemented as photons move from one location to another through space.
Sometimes wires here may just denote the passage of time.
1.4.1 Elementary Quantum Gates
Now how can we describe such quantum gates? Since the evolution of a quantum
state is given by a unitary transformation, it is natural to describe quantum gates
this way. If we talk about a quantum gate, we thus simply refer to a unitary
transformation applied to a number of qubits. In the following, we will refer to an
input of a circuit as a register.
Single Qubit Gates
We first consider gates that act on a single qubit. Some of the most important
quantum gates are given by the Pauli matrices
X ≡
(
0 1
1 0
)
;Y ≡
(
0 −i
i 0
)
;Z ≡
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
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We refer to X as a bit flip, since it maps
X|0〉 = X
(
1
0
)
= |1〉,
X|1〉 = X
(
0
1
)
= |0〉.
The gate described by Z is called a phase flip, since it changes the basis states to
Z|0〉 = |0〉
Z|1〉 = −|1〉
We can write Y = iXZ and observe that
Y |0〉 = i|1〉,
Y |1〉 = −i|0〉.
One of the most important 1-qubit gates which we will make use of is the
Hadamard gate, described by
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
Note that we could equally well express this transformation as H = (X + Z)/
√
2.
Using the vector representation for qubits we see that the effect of H on the basis
states |0〉 and |1〉 is given by
H|0〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
,
H|1〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
.
As we saw earlier, all such unitary transformations are reversible. In particular this
means that also all quantum gates must be reversible. So if we apply H−1 to the
states on the left hand side, we should get back to the original basis states. Noting
that H−1 = H we indeed obtain
H
( |0〉+ |1〉√
2
)
= |0〉,
H
( |0〉 − |1〉√
2
)
= |1〉.
Looking at the last line, we see that the positive and negative amplitudes of |0〉
cancel out to give |1〉, which is an effect known as interference. This is analogous
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to interference of for example light waves, and plays an important role in quantum
computing.
If we want to apply two quantum gates U and V on a single qubit sequentially, we
denote the combined quantum gate using the matrix product of U and V . Thus if we
first let V act on |0〉 followed by U , the resulting state will be UV |0〉. To describe
the actions of an entire circuit however, we will also need to combine operations
acting on different qubits. Consider for example the state |00〉. We now want U to
act on the first qubit, and V on the second one. The effect of the circuit on the state
|00〉 can now be described by the tensor product U ⊗V defined in Appendix A. This
gives us output (U ⊗ V )|00〉 = U |0〉 ⊗ V |0〉.
For example, consider a circuit with n inputs, where we apply a Hadamard
transform to each input. The effect of this circuit is described by
H ⊗H ⊗ . . .⊗H︸ ︷︷ ︸
n H’s
= H⊗n
Suppose we have as input n zeros |0n〉. Then the result of this circuit will be
H⊗n|0n〉 = (∑j∈{0,1}n |j〉)/√2n, which is the uniform superposition of all possible
strings of length n. What happens if we use an arbitrary input |z〉 of n qubits? For
this we obtain
H⊗n|z〉 = 1√
2n
∑
j∈{0,1}n
(−1)z·j |j〉
where z · j =∑nk=1 zkjk denotes the inner product between the n-bit strings z and
j. This n-fold transformation will turn out to be very useful in quantum algorithms.
Rotations
A visualization which is very effective in understanding single qubit gates, is to
consider the representation of a qubit α|0〉 + β|1〉 as a point on the unit sphere.
To make this work, express the qubit as eiγ(cos(θ/2)|0〉 + eiψ sin(θ/2))|1〉 where
γ, θ and ψ are real numbers. As we mentioned earlier, we can ignore the global
phase, since it has no observable effects. Note that this preserves normalization since
|α|2+|β|2 = cos2(θ/2)+sin2(θ/2) = 1. This is called the Bloch sphere representation
(Figure 1.1) and a qubit forms a Bloch vector (cosψ sin θ, sinψ sin θ, cos θ).
The usefulness of this representation becomes immediately apparent when we
consider the effects of the Hadamard transform on a qubit. Note that (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2
can be found in the figure at the intersection of the positive x-axis and the sphere.
It is then easy to see that we can describe the effect of H on (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 as a
rotation around the y axis towards |1〉, followed by a reflection in the x-y plane.
In fact, the Bloch sphere representation allows one to view all single qubit oper-
ations as rotations on this sphere. We write Rs(θ) as the rotation around the axis
s ∈ {x, y, z} by the angle θ. The basic rotations around the x,y and z axis can be ex-
pressed using the Pauli matrices and are given by Rx(θ) = e
−iθX/2, Ry(θ) = e−iθY/2
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Figure 1.1: Bloch Sphere
and Rz(θ) = e
−iθZ/2. Especially important for this text will be the rotation around
the z axis. We can express it in more detail as
Rz(θ) = e
−iθZ/2 =
(
e−iθ/2 0
0 eiθ/2
)
= e−iθ/2
(
1 0
0 eiθ
)
Any arbitrary single qubit operation U can be expressed in terms of these rotations
as
U = eiαRz(β)Ry(γ)Rz(δ)
for some real numbers α,β,γ and δ [65, Theorem 4.1].
Multi-qubit Gates
So far we have only considered gates acting on a single qubit. We now examine
the so-called CNOT (controlled not) gate. It turns out that we can construct any
quantum circuit using only single qubit gates and CNOT. The CNOT gate acts on
2 qubits, and will negate the value of the second qubit, if the first qubit is 1. More
formally we have
CNOT =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0


which maps
CNOT|0〉|b〉 = |0〉|b〉
CNOT|1〉|b〉 = |1〉|1− b〉
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1.4.2 Copying Qubits
In classical computing we can easily make a copy of a bit. Can we do the same using
quantum gates? It turns out that is impossible to copy a arbitrary qubit! This forms
another fundamental difference between classical and quantum computing.
We can verify this intriguing fact by looking at our definition of a quantum gate
above. Suppose there is indeed some gate described by a unitary transform U which
can copy a pure quantum state |ψ〉 to another register |s〉. Thus the effect of U
will be U(|ψ〉|s〉) = |ψ〉|ψ〉. Suppose now that this copying procedure works for two
arbitrary pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉:
U(|ψ〉|s〉) = |ψ〉|ψ〉
U(|φ〉|s〉) = |φ〉|φ〉
If we now take the inner product of these two equations, we obtain 〈ψ|φ〉 = (〈ψ|φ〉)2,
since U †U = I. This is only possible if 〈ψ|φ〉 = 0 or |ψ〉 = |φ〉. Thus either the two
states are the same, or they are orthogonal to each other. It is therefore impossible
to clone quantum states which are not orthogonal to each other, as for example
|0〉 and (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. This reflects the fact that only orthogonal states can be
distinguished from each other with perfect accuracy.
1.4.3 Quantum Queries
In this text we will also require the notion of a quantum query. Just as in the classical
case we can informally specify a query as a question we will ask to a blackbox, which
will give us a certain answer in return.
Later on we consider queries with `-bit answers, where ` ≥ 1. For Σ = {0, 1}`, a
quantum query to a string y ∈ Σm is the unitary transformation specified by
|j〉|z〉 7→ |j〉|z ⊕ yj〉
where j ∈ [m], z ∈ {0, 1}` is called the target register, and z⊕yj is the string resulting
from the xor of the individual bits of z and yj , i.e. z⊕ yj = (z1 ⊕ yj,1) . . . (z` ⊕ yj,`).
It is sometimes convenient to get the query result in the phase. To achieve this,
define
|zT 〉 = 1√
2`
⊗`
i=1
(|0〉+ (−1)Ti |1〉)
where Ti is the ith bit of the `-bit string T . Since |0 ⊕ yj,i〉 + (−1)Ti |1 ⊕ yj,i〉 =
(−1)Ti·yj,i(|0〉+ (−1)Ti |1〉), a query maps
|j〉|zT 〉 7→ |j〉(−1)T ·yj |zT 〉.
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1.4.4 Example: Quantum Teleportation
As an example of a quantum circuit, we will look at quantum teleportation, since this
will become useful for quantum anonymous transmissions later on. This circuit also
provides insight into how extremely useful entangled states can be. Other well known
circuits implement Shor’s factoring algorithm [74] and Grover’s search algorithm [48],
which finds an element in an unsorted list of size N in time proportional to
√
N .
Since we do not make use of these circuits in this text, we refer to the book by
Nielsen and Chuang [65] for an excellent introduction to these algorithms.
For quantum teleportation, we will make use of the EPR pair |E〉 = (|00〉 +
|11〉)/√2 which we encountered earlier. Suppose Alice has the first qubit of this
state, and Bob the second. Alice can now use their shared entanglement to send one
qubit |Ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 to Bob by transmitting only 2 bits of classical information.
Consider the following quantum circuit:
H Measure M1
Measure M2
XM2 ZM1
? ?
|Ψ〉
|Ψ〉


|E〉
Figure 1.2: Quantum Teleportation Circuit
The input of this circuit is
|Ψ〉|E〉 = 1√
2
[α|0〉(|00〉+ |11〉) + β|1〉(|00〉+ |11〉)]
In Figure 1.2, Alice controls the first two wires and Bob the last one. This corre-
sponds to Alice having the state |Ψ〉 and the first qubit of the EPR pair |E〉. Alice
now sends her two qubits through a CNOT gate, which changes the state to
1√
2
[α|0〉(|00〉+ |11〉) + β|1〉(|10〉+ |01〉)] .
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She then applies a Hadamard transform to the first qubit, giving
1
2
[α(|0〉+ |1〉)(|00〉+ |11〉) + β(|0〉 − |1〉)(|10〉+ |01〉)] =
=
1
2
[|00〉(α|0〉+ β|1〉) + |01〉(α|1〉+ β|0〉)+
+|10〉(α|0〉 − β|1〉) + |11〉(α|1〉 − β|0〉)]
Alice now measures her two qubits, which will collapse the state to one of the four
terms in the sum. For example if Alice’s measurement result is 00, we can easily see
from the equation above that Bob’s state is now |Ψ〉. But this is exactly what Alice
was trying to send to Bob! In general we can determine Bob’s state, given Alice’s
measurement outcome:
00 7→ I(α|0〉+ β|1〉) = |Ψ〉
01 7→ X(α|1〉+ β|0〉) = |Ψ〉
10 7→ Z(α|0〉 − β|1〉) = |Ψ〉
11 7→ ZX(α|1〉 − β|0〉) = |Ψ〉
Alice now transmits her measurement outcome M1M2 to Bob. This allows him to
apply the appropriate transform to recover the original state |Ψ〉, which is given by
ZM1XM2 . Note that since Alice still needs to transfer two classical bits before Bob
has any information about |Ψ〉, quantum teleportation does not allow faster than
light communication.
1.4.5 Summary
We have examined the essential building blocks of quantum computing, which dif-
fers fundamentally from classical computing. The state of a quantum computer is
described by a quantum state, which can be a linear combination of several classical
states. We call such a linear combination a superposition. The dimensionality of the
state space grows exponentially with the number of qubits. Operations on quantum
states can be described by unitary operators. All such operations are reversible.
Only a measurement may irrevocably alter the quantum state. Unlike in classical
computing, we cannot copy an arbitrary qubit. Finally, quantum states can be en-
tangled. Such entangled states have a number of interesting properties and form an
important resource for quantum computation.
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Terminology
Analogous to Chapter 1 stating the basic notions of quantum computing, we will
briefly examine the cryptographic notions used in this text. A good in-depth overview
can be found in [62].
2.1 Terminology
In this text we are concerned with multi-party protocols, where the participants
can communicate by sending messages. In this context, we will use the following
terminology:
• An entity, party or player is someone or something that sends, receives and
manipulates information. You and your computer, for example, can both be
entities in a protocol.
• A sender is an entity that is the legitimate transmitter of information.
• A receiver or recipient is an entity that is the legitimate recipient of informa-
tion.
Another notion we will make use of is that of a channel, which allows one entity to
transmit information to another. We will also speak of a secure channel to denote
a channel whose contents are not accessible to an adversary.
An adversary or attacker is an entity that tries to defeat the security provided by
the protocol. Suppose, for example, that the sender tries to transmit an encrypted
message to the recipient. An adversary defeats the security of the encryption proto-
col if he can read the transmitted message. We distinguish two classes of attackers:
• A passive attacker is restricted to observing the channel. That is he is al-
lowed to read messages passing over the network, but he cannot make any
modifications.
• An active attacker can observe the channel and also add, delete or modify any
messages that pass over the channel.
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Note that in many protocols an adversary can simultaneously play the role of
either sender or receiver. In particular we say that
• A participant is honest or correct , if he follows the protocol.
• He is dishonest , malicious or corrupted , if he does not follow the protocol.
If multiple participants work together to defeat the security of the protocol we speak
of a collusion of participants.
2.2 Security Models
Several different models exists to evaluate the security of cryptographic protocols.
2.2.1 Information Theoretic Security
The first model is that of information-theoretic security. We also refer to this as
unconditional security or, in the context of encryption systems, perfect secrecy. Un-
conditional security sounds great, but what exactly does it mean? A protocol that
is unconditionally secure, is secure even if an attacker is granted unlimited compu-
tational resources. We happily provide him with the most powerful computer on
earth and as much memory space as he wants. The main question of unconditional
security is thus whether the attacker obtains enough information to defeat the se-
curity of the system. We can express this notion using the concept of entropy from
information theory [73]. The entropy of a random variable X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(X = x) log p(X = x)
where p(X = x) is the probability that X is in the state x. Entropy is a measure
of information and uncertainty about X. In our setting for example, let E denote
the messages exchanged by a cryptographic protocol and let M be the item the
protocol could be concealing. For each item m in the set of all possible items, there
is a probability p(M = m) that M = m is the real item. For example, E can be
an encrypted message and m the unencrypted message contents. If we are certain
that M = m is the true message, we have p(m) = 1 and our uncertainty is minimal:
H(M) = 0. If, on the other hand, we have no idea which message could possibly be
hidden in E and we thus consider all possible decryptions to be equally likely, our
uncertainty H(M) is maximized. H(M |E) denotes the uncertainty about M given
E. More formally
H(M |E) = −
∑
m
∑
e
p(M = m,E = e) log p(M = m|E = e).
The mutual information
I(M,E) = H(M)−H(M |E)
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then represents how much information an adversary can gain about the true M
by collecting the message exchange E. A system is unconditionally secure if the
knowledge of E does not decrease the uncertainty about M , that is H(M |E) =
H(M). For unconditionally secure protocols we thus have I(M,E) = H(M) −
H(M) = 0. Intuitively this means that even if the attacker collects all messages
during the execution of the protocol, he still cannot learn anything more about M !
Information theoretic security is clearly desirable and corresponds to the intuitive
notion of “secure”. Why would we even want to consider other models? Unfortu-
nately, information-theoretic security is hard to achieve in practice. For example, it
is easy to show that for message encryption, the key used to encrypt the message
must be as long as the message itself to achieve perfect secrecy. Furthermore, once
such a key has been used, we are never allowed to use it again. Clearly this poses
some practical problems as to how we should distribute such keys. It has even been
shown that using only classical communication it is impossible for two remote parties
to establish such a key from scratch [20].
2.2.2 Computational Security
Most forms of practical cryptography are therefore based on what is called compu-
tational security. In this security model, we do not grant an adversary unlimited
computational resources. Instead, we are concerned with the amount of computation
required to break the security of a system. We say that a system is computation-
ally secure, if the perceived level of computation necessary to defeat it exceeds the
computational resources of any hypothetical adversary by a comfortable margin.
The adversary is thereby allowed to use the best known attacks against the system.
Closely related are the concepts of complexity-theoretic security and provable secu-
rity. In this text, we will use the term computational security to encompass both
notions. In complexity-theoretic security, the adversary is modeled as having only
polynomial computational power. This means that any attacks involve time and
space polynomial in the size of the underlying security parameters of the system.
In the setting of provable security, the difficulty of defeating the system’s security
is proven to be as difficult as solving a well-known problem which is thought to be
hard. Note that this does not prove the protocol to be unconditionally secure, but
only makes a statement of equivalence between the security of the protocol and a
hard to compute problem. In practice, these are often number-theoretic problems
such as factoring. Note that for example in the case of factoring, it is not known
whether these problems are truly difficult to solve classically. In quantum comput-
ing, factoring is not a hard assumption any more. Thus “provable” just means the
security is proven given certain hardness assumptions.
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2.3 Resources
In general, we here speak of randomness to denote a string s generated by the
outcomes of a fair coin flip. We say that a participant P “knows” M , if he has
no uncertainty about M or, more formally, H(M |P ) = 0. A participant “does not
know”M , if his uncertainty about M is maximized. In this context we will use the
following terminology:
• We speak of private randomness, if a participant holds randomness that is not
known to any of the other participants of the protocol.
• We speak of shared randomness, if two or more participants know the same
randomness.
• We also talk about private shared randomness, if two or more participants
have shared randomness which is not known to the remaining participants.
We also call this a key. If only two participants share such a key, we also speak
of pairwise private shared randomness. Unless otherwise indicated, in this text
we always mean pairwise private shared randomness when we speak of private
shared randomness.
2.4 Summary
We have described the basic cryptographic notions and terminology necessary for the
understanding of this text. In particular, we have examined the difference between
information-theoretic and computational security. We also introduced the different
types of randomness, which we will refer to frequently.
Part I
Private Information Retrieval
and Locally Decodable Codes
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Chapter 3
Private Information Retrieval
3.1 Introduction
Private information retrieval enables a user to retrieve an entry from a database,
while hiding the index of the requested entry. One straightforward solution for this
problem would be to send the entire database to the user, who can then simply
select the desired item. Whereas this ensures that the database can never learn
the index of the requested entry, it is clearly not very efficient. Can we do with
less communication? The main question of private information retrieval is thus its
communication complexity.
There are numerous practical applications where PIR could play an important
role. Consider for example a database containing medical information. To pro-
tect the privacy of the patients, it is desirable for the database to remain ignorant
about their inquiries. Another practical application could be a database containing
patent information. Imagine for example a scientist who just made a great inven-
tion, say “round wheels are best”, and wants to patent it. For this he will consult
the database to check whether there are any existing patents covering his invention.
However, asking the database for “round wheels” already gives away part of his bril-
liant idea. A malicious database could now apply for a patent itself. And even if
his query does not give away any vital information, the database will at least learn
about the area of research and perhaps start its own investigations. Using private
information retrieval, the user is able to retrieve existing patents from the database,
without letting it know which ones. A similar application is a database contain-
ing pharmaceutical information used for research or databases consulted by stock
traders. If the database for example learns which particular stocks a certain trader
is interested in, it may decide to buy or sell itself. Private information retrieval also
plays a role in anonymous publishing where it is referred to as query anonymity [39].
There it can be used in combination with anonymous transmissions which we will
consider in a later chapter. Several other applications are given by Asonov [8].
A similar problem was first considered in a complexity-theoretic context under
the name of instance hiding by Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian [1] and later Beaver
et al. [14]. Private information retrieval was then introduced in 1995 by Chor,
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Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan [33], and has received considerable attention since.
In the PIR model we view the database as an n-bit string x = x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1}n,
where the user wants to retrieve the i-th bit xi. The database is not allowed to learn
anything about i, while allowing the user to compute xi from its reply. Note that in
particular, this means that the database is also not allowed to learn which items the
user is not interested in. For example, it may not learn that i 6= 3. How do we fit
real world databases into this model, after all a single database entry may be longer
than 1 bit? In this case, we can query the entry of length z bit by bit: we query z
individual n-bit databases.
Clearly just transmitting the entire database as suggested earlier would be the
simplest approach. This, however, is infeasible in practice. It has been shown that
achieving communication of less than n bits with a single server is impossible when
information-theoretic security is required [33]. This is also the case for quantum
PIR [53]. Interestingly however, it is possible to reduce the amount of communication
in this setting, if we allow the database to be replicated over multiple servers each
holding a copy of x. Relaxing the privacy constraint to computational security, it is
possible to achieve sub-linear communication using only a single server.
Outline
We first take a look at information-theoretic PIR and examine a number of exist-
ing protocols for this problem. Known lower bounds for this problem are stated,
which we will improve upon in Chapter 5. We then briefly review the case of com-
putationally secure PIR. In this thesis, we are especially interested in the case of
information-theoretic PIR, since most known computationally secure PIR schemes
can easily be broken once a quantum computer is built. We give known upper and
lower bounds for this problem and review several PIR schemes which illustrate how
multiple servers can be used to reduce the amount of communication.
3.2 Information-Theoretic PIR
3.2.1 Definition
Formally we can define information-theoretic PIR as follows:
Definition 3.2.1 A one-round, (1 − η)-secure, k-server private information re-
trieval (PIR) scheme for a database x ∈ {0, 1}n with recovery probability 1/2 + ε,
query size t, and answer size `, consists of a randomized algorithm (user) and k
deterministic algorithms S1, . . . , Sk (servers), such that
1. On input i ∈ [n], the user produces k t-bit queries q1, . . . , qk and sends these to
the respective servers. The jth server sends back an `-bit string aj = Sj(x, qj).
The user outputs a bit f(a1, . . . , ak) where f depends on i and his randomness.
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Figure 3.1: 2-server Private Information Retrieval
2. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [n] we have Pr[f(a1, . . . , ak) = xi] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
3. For all x ∈ {0, 1}n, j ∈ [k], and any two indices i1, i2 ∈ [n], the two distribu-
tions on qj (over the user’s randomness) induced by i1 and i2 are η-close in
total variation distance.
We say that the scheme uses b bits, if the user only uses b predetermined bits from
each query answer of length `: he outputs f(a1|S1 , . . . , ak|Sk) where the sets S1, . . . , Sk
are of size b each and are determined by i and the user’s randomness.
The scheme is called linear, if for every j and qj the jth server’s answer Sj(x, qj)
is a linear combination (over GF (2)) of the bits of x.
The setting η = 0 corresponds to the case where the server gets no information
at all about i. All known non-trivial PIR schemes have η = 0, perfect recovery (ε =
1/2), and only one round of communication. Servers are not allowed to communicate.
We furthermore assume a secure channel between the user and the servers, i.e. a
server cannot monitor transmissions to and from another server.
Using k ≥ 2 non-communicating servers allows for PIR with less than n bits
of communication. Each of the k servers has a copy of the n-bit database x. The
individual server should learn nothing about i, even if it has unlimited computational
resources. Since the k servers are not allowed to communicate with each other,
this gives information-theoretic privacy for the user. To retrieve an item from the
database, the user is allowed to send a query qj to database j, which will send back
an answer aj . The user now selects b bits of each answer and combines them to
compute the value of xi. We can visualize this for the 2-server case in Figure 3.1.
3.2.2 Example Protocols
To illustrate how multiple servers can be used to reduce the communication com-
plexity of PIR, we take a look at some of the known PIR schemes [33].
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Square scheme
We first examine a very simple 2-server PIR scheme having η = 0 and ε = 1/2. The
database x = x1 . . . xn is arranged in a square:
x =


x1 x2 · · · x√n
x√n+1
. . . x2
√
n
... xi
...
... · · · · · · · · · xn


The index i can now be described by two coordinates (i1, i2). The user picks a
random string A ∈ {0, 1}
√
n, and sends
√
n-bit queries q1 = A and q2 = A ⊕ ei1
to the two servers, respectively. The first server returns the
√
n-bit answer a1 =
q1 ·C1, . . . , q1 ·C√n, where q1 ·Cc denotes the inner product mod 2 of q1 with the cth
column of x. The second server sends a2 analogously. The user selects the bit q1 ·Ci2
from a1 and q2 ·Ci2 from a2 and xors these two bits to get (A·Ci2)⊕((A⊕ei1)·Ci2) =
ei1 · Ci2 = xi. This scheme has query and answer length t = ` =
√
n and uses b = 1
bits from each answer.
Combinatorial Cubes
Instead of arranging x in a square, we can also associate it with a d-dimensional
cube [c]d [33]. For this protocol, we require k = 2d servers initially. The number of
servers can later be reduced using a method based on covering codes.
Assume without loss of generality that n = cd, which allows us to arrange x in
a d-dimensional cube where each index i ∈ [n] can now be described by coordinates
(i1, . . . , id) ∈ [c]d. For reasons that will become apparent shortly, it is convenient
to describe all 2d servers by their binary index in {0, 1}d. Let eij denote the [c]-bit
string corresponding to the singleton set S = {ij}
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Protocol 1: PIR Combinatorial Cubes
1: The user U uniformly and independently picks d strings S01 , S
0
2 , . . . , S
0
d ⊆
[c].
2: U now constructs d strings in [c] by setting S1j = S
0
j ⊕ eij for each j ∈ [d].
U now has d pairs of strings (S01 , S
1
1), . . . , (S
0
d , S
1
d).
3: U sends a single string of each pair to each of the 2d servers: To server
with id D = σ1, . . . , σd ∈ {0, 1}d he sends query qD = Sσ11 , . . . , Sσdd .
4: Server D now computes the xor of all the bits in the subcube defined by
Sσ11 , . . . , S
σd
d ,
aD =
⊕
j1∈Sσ11 ,...,jd∈S
σd
d
xj1,...,jd ,
and sends aD back to the U .
5: U now computes: xi =
⊕
D∈{0,1}d(aD)
Comparing the different subcubes, it is easy to see that only index (i1, . . . , id)
occurs in exactly one subcube. All other indices appear in an even number of
subcubes. Thus the bits corresponding to those indices cancel in the sum and what
is left is just xi1,...,id = xi. The privacy of this protocol follows from the fact that
the user chooses d c-bit strings completely at random. The difference between the
string S0j and S
1
j is exactly one bit, corresponding to the index ij . Each server,
however, receives only one of these strings and not both. Thus the server simply
sees a uniformly random (d · c)-bit string as a query, from which he cannot infer
anything.
To each of the k = 2d servers we send d c-bit strings, giving a query length of
t = d·c. The length of the answers is ` = 1. Thus the total amount of communication
is given by k(t+ `) = 2d(d · c+ 1) = 2d(dn1/d + 1). Using the fact that k = 2d this
construction uses Ω(k log(k)n1/ log k + k) bits of communication.
The number of servers can be reduced to k < 2d using a method derived from
covering codes. Note that since the difference between two strings S0j and S
1
j is only
one bit, a server with id D can effectively simulate any other server whose binary
id D′ has Hamming distance d(D,D′) = 1. Server D can simply flip each successive
bit in each S
σDj
j where σ
D
j 6= σD
′
j . For example, for a cube of dimension d = 3, server
D = 000 who received query S01 , S
0
2 , S
0
3 , can emulate server 100 by flipping each bitm
in S01 and computing the xor of of all bits in that subcube. It then sends each of the
c extra bits back to the user, who can then select the bit of the reply corresponding
to m = i1. Likewise server 000 can simulate servers 010 and 001, and server 111 can
simulate servers 011,101 and 110. We can therefore reduce the number of servers
from 23 to 2. In addition to simulating 3 other servers, each server computes the
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answer corresponding to the original query and xors it with each bit in the query
reply. The length of the answers is now ` = 3n1/3. The user selects the b = 3 bits
from each answer corresponding to the answers he would have received from the
simulated servers. Generally Chor et al. [33] show that this method can be used to
obtain a k-server PIR with communication complexity k + (2d + (d − 1) · k) · n1/d
using a k-word covering code for {0, 1}d. A covering code, Cd, with radius one for
{0, 1}d is a collection of codewords Cd = {c1, c2, . . . , ck} ⊆ {0, 1}d, such that all
words at Hamming distance one from the codewords cover the entire space {0, 1}d.
Let B(s, 1) be the set of all d-bit strings at Hamming distance one from s. Then
{0, 1}d ⊆ ∪cj∈CdB(cj , 1). As noted earlier, a server can simulate all servers whose id
is at Hamming distance one from its own server id. Using only k codewords cj from
a covering code as k server ids allows all remaining servers to be simulated. In the
example above, we used the covering code C3 = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)} of {0, 1}3 with
radius one.
The only remaining question is, how big does k have to be in order to cover the
entire space {0, 1}d? It has been shown that k ≤ 2d/(d+1) for most cases [33]. This
shows that the simulation method is most interesting, if d is small. The amount of
communication is then in O(k log kn1/(log k+log log k)) [33], [42].
3.2.3 Upper Bounds
In their original paper [33], Chor et al. suggested a scheme using O(k log k n1/ log k)
bits of communication, which we examined in Section 3.2.2. Using covering codes,
this can be extended to O(k log k n1/(log k+log log k)) [33]. They also give an O(log n)-
server PIR with communication complexity O(log2 n log logn). Finally, their scheme
based on polynomials uses O(k2 log(k)n1/k) bits of communication [42]. Ambai-
nis [4], however, constructed a much more efficient scheme for k > 2 servers based
on the 2-server scheme from [33] using recursion. A (k+1)-server scheme is built from
an existing k-server scheme. This construction gives a protocol with O(2k
2
n1/(2k−1))
bits of communication. Itoh [51] gives a slightly different PIR scheme with com-
plexity O(k!n1/(2k−1)). Yet more efficient schemes based on the idea of representing
the database by polynomials, result in a scheme with complexity O(k3n1/(2k−1)).
Protocols using this representation are based on a generalization of a multi-party
communication protocol by Babai, Kimmel, and Lokam [12] in the simultaneous
message model. Beimel, Ishai and Kushilevitz first considered this approach in [32]
and [16]. Together with Raymond these authors use this representation to construct
a k-server protocol with nO(log log k/(k log k)) bits of communication [18].
We summarize the known upper bounds in Table 3.1 based on [18], [42] and [33].
3.3 Computationally Secure PIR 29
Tool 2 DB 3 DB 4 DB k DB Reference
Square/Cube n1/2 - n1/2 k · n1/ log k [33]
Covering Codes n1/3 - n1/4 k log k · n1/(log k+log log k) [33]
Polynomials n1/2 n1/3 n1/4 k2 log k · n1/k [32]
Recursion n1/3 n1/5 n1/7 2k
2
n1/(2k−1) [4]
Linear Algebra n1/3 n1/5 n1/7 k!n1/(2k−1) [51]
Polynomials n1/3 n1/5 n1/7 k3n1/(2k−1) [17], [16]
Polynomials n1/3 n1/5.25 n1/7.87 nO(log log k/(k log k)) [18]
Table 3.1: PIR Communication Complexity, up to a constant factor
3.2.4 Lower Bounds
Without the privacy condition, we require exactly logn+1 bits to transmit the index
i and receive xi as an answer. The communication complexity of private information
retrieval can thus only be worse. But how much worse exactly?
Much effort has gone into determining good lower bounds for PIR, however the
problem appears to be rather tricky [42]. Chor et al. [33] showed that for k = 1
servers, we require at least n bits of communication. They also showed that for a
linear PIR scheme with k = 2 servers and single bit answers, where the user makes
one query to each server requires a query length of n − 1 bits. Beigel, Fortnow
and Gasarch [15] showed that if we do not make any restrictions on the query, the
query length must be at least n − 2 bits. If the server’s answers are longer than
1 bit the following bounds are known: Goldreich, Karloff, Schulman and Trevisan
showed that for 2-server linear PIR, with t-bit queries and `-bit answers, where the
user only looks at b predetermined positions in each answer, we have query length
t = Ω(n/`b) [47]. Kerenidis and de Wolf [53] showed that for general PIR, the query
length satisfies t = Ω(n/26`).
For the case of more than 2 servers, Mann [60] showed that we require at least
(k2/(k − 1) − ε) log n bits of communication when we are using k servers. For two
servers this means the lower bound becomes 4 log n. This has been improved to
4.4 logn [53].
In Chapter 5 we generalize the results of Goldreich et al. [47] and improve the
results of Kerenidis and de Wolf [53].
3.3 Computationally Secure PIR
We can decrease the number of databases necessary to achieve sub-linear communi-
cation by relaxing the security of our model. If we are content with computationally
secure PIR (CPIR), Chor and Gilboa [30] showed that for any ε > 0, there exists a
2-server PIR with communication complexity O(nε) if one-way functions exist. The
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existence of one-way functions implies the existence of a pseudo-random generator
G which expands seeds of length s(n) = nδ to length n, for any constant δ > 0.
To obtain a communication complexity of O(nε) the authors use δ = 1/t where the
parameter t is the first integer larger than 2/ε − 3. The security of the system is
based on the assumption that the expanded strings are pseudo-random with respect
to poly(n)-distinguishers: an adversary only has computational resources in poly(n).
This form of CPIR is referred to as CPIR with replication.
Contrary to the information-theoretically secure setting, computationally secure
PIR also allows for sub-linear communication using only a single server without
replication. This makes CPIR more applicable in practice. The security of these
schemes, however, rests on the assumption that certain computational problems are
infeasible for the server. So now we no longer grant the server unlimited computa-
tional power. In practice, the security of all known CPIR schemes rests on number
theoretic assumptions, most notably the Quadratic Residuosity Problem [55] and
the φ-hiding assumption [25]. The Quadratic Residuosity Problem is to determine
whether z is a quadratic residue modulo m, where gcd(z,m) = 1 and z,m ∈ N.
Recall that z is a quadratic residue modulo m if there exists an integer a such that
a2 ≡ z mod m. The φ-hiding assumption also depends on a number theoretic con-
cept. Recall that φ is the Euler totient function, where φ(m) gives the number of
integers k such that 0 < k < m and gcd(m, k) = 1, i.e. m and k are relatively prime.
Note that computing φ(m) on input m is just as hard as factoring m [25]. We say
that a composite integer m φ-hides a prime p, if p|φ(m). The φ-hiding assumption
then states that it is computationally infeasible to decide whether a small prime
p divides φ(m), where m is a composite integer of unknown factorization. More
information about number theoretic concepts in use can be found in [62] and [72].
Much work has been done in the area of CPIR and we only give a brief overview
here, as our focus rests on information-theoretic PIR. Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky
make use of the Quadratic Residuosity Problem [55] to construct, for any ε > 0,
a 1-server CPIR with O(nε) bits of communication. Their scheme has an addi-
tional communication complexity polynomial in a security parameter t, but since
t is quite small for all practical purposes, it is accounted for in O(nε) [25]. The
same communication complexity is achieved by a protocol proposed by Yamamura
and Saito [87] based on the subgroup membership problem, which generalizes the
quadratic residuosity problem. In a later paper, Kushilevitz et al. [56] also show that
one-way trapdoor permutations are sufficient for 1-server PIR. Their protocol also
requires O(nε) of communication. Cachin, Micali and Stadler [25] give a 1-server
PIR with communication complexity O(log4 n)t, where t is a security parameter.
Lipmaa [58] more recently constructed a 1-server PIR based on the Damg˚ard-Jurik
public key cryptographic system which further improves the communication com-
plexity to O(log2(n)) · t for a security parameter t which is small for all practical
purposes. Other implementations have been considered by Chang [26] and Stern [77].
We summarize the known upper bounds for CPIR in Table 3.2.
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Assumption 1 DB 2 DB Reference
Pseudo-Random Generator O(nε) [30]
Quadratic Residuosity O(nε) [55]
One-Way Trapdoor Permutation O(nε) [56]
Subgroup Membership O(nε) [87]
φ-hiding Assumption polylog(n) [25]
Damg˚ard-Jurik Public Key O((log(n) log log(n))) [58]
Table 3.2: CPIR Communication Complexity
3.4 Related Protocols and Extensions
There are several extensions to PIR and a number of related protocols. We briefly
review some of them here for completeness’ sake. We will only be concerned with
the standard PIR model later on in this text.
3.4.1 t-private PIR
So far we assumed that the servers do not communicate with each other. In the
setting of t-private PIR, we allow up to t of the k servers to collude. This means
they are allowed to work together and pool their information. More formally we call
a PIR scheme t-private, if no subset of t servers can determine anything about i [32].
The schemes we considered earlier are thus 1-private.
In their original conference paper [32], Chor et al. presented a t-private PIR with
O(tnt/k) bits of communication also based on polynomials. Since then Beimel, Ishai
and Kushilevitz [17] have constructed a t-private PIR, for any ε > 0 and k > t ≥ 1,
where the user sends O(logn) bits to each server and receives O(nt/k+ε) bits in
return. Beimel et al. [16] have also given a scheme with complexity O(n1/b(2k−1)/tc).
More recently Blundo, D’Arco and DeSantis [22] gave a different t-private PIR with
complexity O(k
√
n) for t ≤ k − 1. Their scheme is somewhat similar to the square
scheme we examined earlier, however instead of a perfect square, they divide the
database up into small blocks (i.e. columns). Their construction is interesting if
t > k/2.
3.4.2 Robust PIR
What if some of the servers break down or send back the wrong answers? The
PIR schemes considered earlier offer no protection against such faults. Beimel and
Stahl [2] define a k-out-of-m PIR as an m-server PIR, which still gives the correct
answer even if only k of the m servers send back a reply. So far, all schemes we
considered were k-out-of-k PIRs. In particular, they show that if there exists a
2-out-of-2 PIR with c bits of communication, then there exists a 2-out-of-m PIR
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with communication O(c · m logm). Since we have a 2-server PIR with O(n1/3)
bits of communication, this implies that there is a 2-out-of-m PIR with complexity
O(n1/3m logm).
3.4.3 PIR with Preprocessing
So far we have only considered communication complexity. In practice, however,
we may also be interested in reducing the workload of a server. In the schemes
presented earlier, the database has to compute large sums over many of the n bits
of the database. Beimel, Ishai and Malkin [19] suggested that the workload may be
reduced by preprocessing at the expense of extra storage. For example in the cube
scheme above, we could precompute the xor of all possible cubes of the database.
The authors present several methods to solve this problem. In particular, they
construct for any constants k ≥ 2 and ε > 0: A k-server variant of their polyno-
mial schemes with communication complexity O(n1/(2k−1)) where the work of the
database is O(n/(ε logn)2k−2) and O(n1+ε) additional bits of storage are required;
A k-server protocol with O(n1/k+ε) communication and work and nO(1) storage; A
protocol with a polylogarithmic number of servers, polylogarithmic communication
and work, and O(n1+ε) storage. And finally a computationally private k-server
protocol with O(nε) communication, O(n1/k+ε) work and nO(1) storage.
From the first two items, we can see that there is a tradeoff between communica-
tion complexity and the workload imposed on the server. The authors furthermore
show that the product of extra storage required by the servers and the expected
amount of work is at least linear in the database size n.
3.4.4 Retrieving Other Types of Data: Blocks and Keyword Searches
As we mentioned earlier, a straightforward way to allow each database item to be
larger than one bit, say m bits instead, is to execute m instances of PIR. Thereby
we retrieve the entire block bit by bit. A better scheme has been suggested by Chor
et al. [33]. Suppose our database contains a total of n bits which we break up into
n/s blocks of size s each. Also suppose that there exists some k-server PIR with
block size s = 1, query length t and answer length `. Then there exists a k-server
PIR with block size s > 1 where the user sends t bits to each server, who sends s`
bits as a reply.
Chor, Gilboa and Naor also consider Private Information Retrieval by key-
words [31]. In this setting the user can search the database for specific keywords,
instead of an index i. This is very useful in the case that the user does not actu-
ally know the index. Imagine for example an online search engine such as Google.
Clearly you would not want to remember individual indices, even if you could obtain
them somehow. More formally, PIR by Keyword assumes a database containing n
strings of length s. The user can now query for a certain keyword w ∈ {0, 1}s. The
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user now wants to determine if w is in this list of strings, without the database learn-
ing anything about w. The authors give solutions to this problem with complexity∑logn
q=1 C(s, 2
q−1, k) where C(s, n, k) is the communication complexity of a k-server
PIR with an n-block database of s-bit blocks.
3.4.5 Repudiative Information Retrieval
A slightly weaker scenario has been considered by Asonov and Freytag [10] in the
form of Repudiative Information Retrieval (RIR). Here the server is allowed to gain
some information about the desired index i. However it must be possible for the
user to later deny any claims that he retrieved a particular item. More formally
the repudiation property is preserved if and only if for all i we have 0 < Pr(q =
i|Irevealed) < 1, where Irevealed is the information obtained by the database, q denotes
the queried index. The probability is taken over the protocols behaviour. The
distribution depends on the actual RIR scheme used. For RIR that is equal to
information-theoretic PIR this is the uniform distribution.
3.4.6 Symmetrically-Private Information Retrieval
So far the user was allowed to learn more about the database than the entry he asked
for. Our only requirement was that the database learns nothing about the identity
of the queried item. In Symmetrically-Private Information Retrieval (SPIR), we
additionally also demand that the user learns exactly the item he asked for and no
more. In this setting, the privacy constraint is thus extended to the data. SPIR
has first been considered by Gertner, Ishai, Kushilevitz and Malkin [44] [59], who
present a k-server SPIR scheme with communication complexity O(n1/(2k−1)). The
same authors also show there is no information theoretically secure SPIR with k
non-communicating databases, even if the databases are allowed to hold private and
independent random inputs, and the user is honest. This impossibility result holds
even if multiple rounds of interactions between the databases and the user are al-
lowed. In particular, this means that single database SPIR is impossible. However,
a protocol for PIR can be extended to SPIR when the servers are allowed private
shared randomness which is hidden from the user. Kerenidis and de Wolf give a hon-
est user quantum protocol which does not make use of any shared randomness [54].
A 1-server SPIR scheme is also known as
(
n
1
)
-OT (1-out-of-n oblivious trans-
fer), and has received considerable attention in the literature. A k-server SPIR
corresponds to distributed
(
n
1
)
-OT. Whereas the goal is the same, research on SPIR
focuses on the communication complexity of the problem, whereas research about
OT is primarily concerned with cryptographic security and how OT relates to other
cryptographic primitives.
A similar problem has also been considered as early as 1987 by Brassard, Robert
and Cre´peau under the name of All-Or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets [24]. Here
the scenario is phrased in terms of a vendor and a buyer: The vendor wants to
34 Private Information Retrieval
sell information to the buyer, however, the buyer should obtain exactly one item
of information and not more. For example the buyer could have items such as
“where is Bin Laden” available for purchase. The buyer wants to obtain information
from the vendor, without revealing what information he is interested in. After all,
the vendor may otherwise add another item to his information shop, such as “people
who want to know where Bin Laden is”. Another computationally secure protocol for
this problem was presented later by Stern [77]. This problem was already partially
solved in 1970 by Wiesner [85] fulfilling the privacy requirements for the vendor.
The vendor can encode and send up to three messages using quantum states, no two
of which can be received by the buyer.
3.4.7 Further PIR Variations
Another variant of PIR introduces a third party that can help facilitate the pro-
tocol, without learning anything by itself. This is a general technique introduced
by Beaver [13] also applied outside the realm of PIR. DiCrescenzo et al. [38] first
applied this technique to PIR and thereby created Commodity Based PIR. Here
the third party provides the server and the user with a shared random string. The
length of this string is also referred to as the commodity complexity. The goal is
to reduce direct communication between the user and the server at the expense of
a higher commodity complexity. The server and the user can make use of the new-
found resource to perform a k-server PIR with communication complexity O(logn)
and commodity complexity O(n1/(k−1)).
Gertner et al. [43] consider a k-server PIR scheme, where the database is not
replicated over all k servers. Their aim is to keep the database x itself hidden from
up to t colluding database servers.
Finally in the realm of practical PIR applications, Smith and Safford [75] con-
sider a PIR using additional specialized hardware in the form of Secure Coprocessors.
These tamper-proof devices are trusted to carry out computations without the pos-
sibility of an adversary interfering, even if the adversary has physical access to the
device. The user thereby sends its query encrypted with the public key of the device
to the server. The key idea is that only the device can decrypt the users query. It
now reads the entire database, encrypts the requested item with a key supplied by
the user and sends it back. This scheme is thus computationally secure. Asonov et
al. [9] considered the use of preprocessing using Secure Coprocessors as well. This
has important practical implications, since such devices are currently available on
the market.
3.4.8 Quantum PIR
Finally, a quantum PIR is characterized by a quantum server and communication
over a quantum channel. The definition for PIR above can thus be generalized to the
quantum case. Kerenidis and de Wolf [53] constructed a 2-server quantum PIR with
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communication complexity O(n3/10) based on a 4-server classical PIR with binary
answers.
3.5 Summary
We have explored the notion of private information retrieval. PIR allows a user
to retrieve an entry from a database, without revealing the index of this entry.
This cryptographic primitive forms an important building block for privacy-sensitive
applications. Even though sub-linear communication is not possible in the setting
of information-theoretic security when using only a single server, we saw that using
multiple servers does give an improvement. We have also examined known lower
bounds for this problem, which we will improve upon in Chapter 5. However, before
we can prove these new bounds, we first turn to a coding method closely related to
PIR: locally decodable codes.
Chapter 4
Locally Decodable Codes
4.1 Introduction
Error-correcting codes allow reliable transmission and storage of information in noisy
environments. Consider for example transmissions over a wireless network. During
transit some of the bits may be corrupted, which we would like to restore using
an error-correcting code. Likewise the data stored on a CD or your hard drive is
protected against noise by such codes. In these applications we usually encode each
block of data separately. This has the advantage that we can decode the data block
by block depending on what portion of the data we are interested in. However,
data will be lost forever if one block is corrupted in such a way we can no longer
reconstruct it. Consider for example a game contained on a single CD. If one block
of data, viz. one part of the executable is missing, the user will be unable to run
the program.
A different approach is to encode the entire body of data in a single codeword
and not split it up in blocks first. This would make our encoding more resilient
against errors. The disadvantage of this approach is that in order to restore any
part of the data, we would need to read the entire codeword at least once. Clearly
this is not very practical. Imagine for example that to read a single file in your home
directory we would need to examine the entire contents of the hard drive.
Locally decodable codes (LDCs) differ from standard error-correcting codes. Here
any bit can be reconstructed by reading only a few randomly chosen locations in the
codeword. Thus a locally decodable code C : {0, 1}n → Σm over alphabet Σ is an
error-correcting code that allows efficient decoding of individual bits of the encoded
information: given any string y that is sufficiently close to the real codeword C(x),
we can probabilistically recover any bit xi of the original input x, while only looking
at k ≤ m positions of y. The code length m measures the cost of the encoding,
while k measures the efficiency of decoding individual bits. The main complexity
question of interest here is the tradeoff between the code length, m, and the number
of queries, k. Think of applications encoding a large chunk of data in order to
protect it from noise, where we are only interested in extracting small pieces at a
time. Imagine for example an encoding of all books in a library, where we would
like to retrieve only the first paragraph of this text.
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Outline
We first define LDCs and smooth codes. Then we take a look at known upper and
lower bounds for this problem. In Chapter 5 we improve upon the best known lower
bounds. LDCs have a very close relation to the problem of PIR examined in the
last chapter. Finally, we illustrate this fact by showing how to construct an LDC
starting with a PIR scheme.
4.2 Definition
Formally we can define a locally decodable code as follows.
Definition 4.2.1 C : {0, 1}n → Σm is a (k, δ, ε)-locally decodable code (LDC), if
there exists a classical randomized decoding algorithm A with input i ∈ [n] and
oracle access to a string y ∈ Σm such that
1. A makes k distinct queries j1, . . . , jk to y, non-adaptively, gets query answers
a1 = yj1 , . . . , ak = yjk and outputs a bit f(a1, . . . , ak), where f depends on i
and A’s randomness.
2. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n, i ∈ [n], and y ∈ Σm with Hamming distance d(y, C(x)) ≤
δm we have Pr[f(a1, . . . , ak) = xi] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
Here probabilities are taken over A’s internal randomness. For Σ = {0, 1}`, we
say the LDC uses b bits, if A only uses b predetermined bits of each query answer:
it outputs f(a1|S1 , . . . , ak|Sk) where the sets S1, . . . , Sk are of size b each and are
determined by i and A’s randomness.
The LDC is called linear, if C is a linear function over GF (2) (i.e. C(x+ y) =
C(x) + C(y)).
4.3 Smooth codes
Related to locally decodable codes are so called smooth codes. These are codes
where the decoding algorithm spreads its queries ”smoothly” across the codeword,
meaning it queries no code location too frequently. Since our proofs will make use
of the notion of smooth codes, we review the definition here.
Definition 4.3.1 C : {0, 1}n → Σm is a (k, c, ε)-smooth code (SC), if there exists
a classical randomized decoding algorithm A with input i ∈ [n] and oracle access to
C(x) such that
1. A makes k distinct queries j1, . . . , jk to C(x), non-adaptively, gets query an-
swers a1 = C(x)j1 , . . . , ak = C(x)jk and outputs a bit f(a1, . . . , ak), where f
depends on i and A’s randomness.
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2. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [n] we have Pr[f(a1, . . . , ak) = xi] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
3. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n, i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], Pr[A queries j] ≤ c/m.
The smooth code uses b bits, if A only uses b predetermined bits of each query answer.
Note that the decoder of smooth codes deals only with valid codewords C(x).
The decoding algorithm of an LDC on the other hand can deal with corrupted
codewords y that are still sufficiently close to the original. Katz and Trevisan [52,
Theorem 1] showed that LDCs and smooth codes are closely related:
Theorem 4.3.2 (Katz & Trevisan) If C : {0, 1}n → Σm is a (k, δ, ε)-locally de-
codable code, then C is also a (k, k/δ, ε)-smooth code (the property of using b bits
carries over).
4.4 Upper Bounds
4.4.1 Examples
To get a better feel for LDCs, we examine two of them in more detail: The Hadamard
Code and LDCs based on PIR.
Hadamard Code
As an example of a locally decodable code, we take a look at the so called Hadamard
code. Here we encode each x of length n by setting the j-th bit of the codeword to
C(x)j = j · x mod 2
for all possible j ∈ {0, 1}n. Each codeword has then exactly m = 2n bits.
If we now want to retrieve the i-th bit of x, we randomly choose a j ∈ {0, 1}n
and read bits C(x)j and C(x)j′ with j
′ = j ⊕ ei from the encoding. We then xor
the two replies to get C(x)j ⊕ C(x)j⊕ei = (j · x) ⊕ ((j ⊕ ei) · x) mod 2 = (ei · x)
mod 2 = xi. Figure 4.1 visualizes this concept.
We can thus retrieve xi perfectly when there is no noise at all, since then y =
C(x). What happens if the codeword is corrupted? Suppose we have d(y, C(x)) =
δm. The parameter δ thus determines the fraction of corrupted bits. Alternatively
we can also view δ as the probability of a bit being corrupted, which gives an
expected number of δm corrupted bits. Looking at our reconstruction algorithm, it
is easy to see that it fails if either C(x)j or C(x)j⊕ei is corrupted. This happens with
probability at most δ + δ = 2δ. We can therefore reconstruct xi with probability
1− 2δ.
Since we want a recovery probability of 1/2+ ε, we have ε = 1/2− 2δ > 0. This
means that we expect to reconstruct xi with a small bias as long as δ < 1/4.
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C(x)1
?
C(x)j ⊕ C(x)j′ = xi
C(x)mC(x)j C(x)j′
Figure 4.1: 2-query Locally Decodable Code
LDC based on PIR
As indicated earlier, there is a close relation between LDCs and the notion of PIR.
Goldreich et al. [47, Lemma 7.1] formalized this connection in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4.1 (GKST) Suppose there is a one-round, (1− η)-secure PIR scheme
with two servers, database size n, query size t, answer size `, and recovery probability
at least 1/2 + ε. Then there is a (2, 3, ε − η)-smooth code C : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}`)m,
where m ≤ 6 · 2t. Furthermore:
1. If in the PIR scheme the answer bits are a linear combination of the data, then
C is linear.
2. If in the PIR scheme, the user only uses b predetermined bits of the ` bits it
receives as an answer to each question, then the same property is true for the
decoding algorithm of C.
The main idea behind their proof is to view PIR as an encoding of the database
x ∈ {0, 1}n. The codeword C(x) then consists of the answers a PIR system could
give for each conceivable query to each of the two servers; hence C(x) ∈ ({0, 1}`)2·2t .
The user can now reconstruct the bit xi from C(x) by looking at the two entries
in the codeword corresponding to the queries he would have sent to the two PIR
servers to retrieve xi. This gives him C(x)q0 = a0 and C(x)q1 = a1. He can then
calculate xi from answers a0 and a1 as in the PIR protocol. The privacy condition
of PIR is translated into the smoothness property of the resulting code. You may
wonder why we have m ≤ 6 · 2t above, instead of only a factor of 2. This is due to
the fact that some entries are replicated in order to obtain a smooth encoding, i.e.
where each entry is uniformly distributed.
Let’s see how this works in practice. Consider the simple square scheme PIR we
examined in Section 3.2.2. Here the database was arranged into a
√
n × √n grid.
The user randomly chose
√
n bits which formed the first query, q0. The second query
was then of the form q1 = q0 ⊕ ei. This means the set of all possible queries is the
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set of all
√
n-bit strings. We thus have m = O(2
√
n) and ` =
√
n. The j-th entry of
the codeword is then given by C(x)j ∈ {0, 1}
√
n with C(x)j = aj the answer of the
server, which was the inner product of the query with each column. The user then
selects b = 1 bits from each C(x)j and xors them together to get xi as in the original
Square PIR Scheme. We thus see that also the number of bits selected carries over
to the smooth code C : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}
√
n)O(2
√
n).
Likewise we can also construct a PIR scheme based on a smooth encoding [52].
Given a (k, k, ε)-smooth code C : {0, 1}n → Σm, where each position is equally likely
to be queried, we can build a k-server PIR with query length log(m) and answer
length log(|Σ|) and recovery probability 1/2 + ε.
We will make use of this intricate connection later on, to derive new lower bounds
for PIR from lower bounds for LDCs.
4.4.2 Overview
Several LDC schemes are known. Note that an error-correcting code which produces
a single codeword of length O(n) where we have to read the entire codeword to
reconstruct a single bit, can be phrased as an LDC with m = O(n) and number
of queries k = m. The Hadamard code, which we examined above, is an example
of an LDC which uses less then m queries. It has a code length of 2n. Babai et
al. [11] construct an LDC with m = poly(n) provided that the number of queries is
polylogarithmic in n. Furthermore, Beimel et al. [18] use the connection between PIR
and LDCs to construct a binary code (i.e. where each codeword entry corresponds
to 1 bit) of length 2n
O(log log k/(k log k))
.
We can summarize these known bounds in a small table:
Name/Based on Code length Reference Notes
Standard ECC O(n) k = O(n)
Hadamard Code 2n k = 2
LDC from PIR 2n
O(log log k/(k log k))
[18]
Babai et al. poly(n) [11] k = polylog(n)
Table 4.1: LDC Code Length
4.5 Lower Bounds
As mentioned earlier, the main complexity question of interest is the tradeoff between
m and k. Except for the k = 2 case with fairly small alphabet Σ, no good lower
bounds are known.
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Katz and Trevisan [52], who first initiated the search for lower bounds for LDCs,
showed that for a single query k = 1, LDCs do not exist if n is larger than some
constant depending on δ and ε. This reflects the impossibility of a single-server
PIR with sub-linear communication and information theoretic security. The same
authors also present a super-linear but at most quadratic lower bound for a constant
number of queries k ≥ 2: m = Ω(n1+1/(q−1)).
Goldreich et al. [47] showed that m = Ω(2δεn/8), if C is a linear code. This
is an exponential lower bound for linear codes with k = 2 queries and constant
alphabet. This has been improved for linear binary codes (` = 1) by Obata [66] to
m ≥ 2Ω(δn/(1−2ε)), which is optimal. Kerenidis and de Wolf [53] extended the result
of Goldreich et al. to all codes, using techniques from quantum computing. For
alphabet Σ = {0, 1}` their lower bound is
m = 2Ω(n/2
5`).
They also slightly improved the polynomial lower bounds of [52] for k > 2. Clearly
the above lower bound becomes trivial if each position of the codeword has ` ≥
log(n)/5 bits.
In the next chapter, we will analyze the case where ` can be much larger, but
the decoder uses only b bits out of the ` bits that a query gives. The b positions that
he uses may depend on the index i he is interested in, as well as his randomness.
Goldreich et al. [47] also analyzed this situation, and showed the following lower
bound for linear codes:
m = 2Ω(n/
∑b
i=0 (
`
i)).
Note that even though LDC and PIR are closely related, the focus of the lower
bounds is slightly different. In the LDC scenario, we are interested in finding a
lower bound for the code length m when using a small alphabet. This corresponds
to a lower bound for the query length t in PIR as we saw in the previous section. In
PIR however, we are additionally interested in a lower bound on the total amount of
communication given by the sum of the query and answer length, (t+ `). In terms
of an LDC this means we desire a bound on log(m) + log(|Σ|).
4.6 Summary
We have examined the notion of locally decodable codes, which are error-correcting
codes that allow efficient reconstruction of individual bits from a codeword, without
having to read all of it. An example of a locally decodable code is the Hadamard
code. We can also construct a locally decodable code based on private information
retrieval, which illustrates the close connection between the two. Finally, we have
introduced the notion of a smooth code, which we will require in the construction
of our proofs in the following chapter.
Chapter 5
Improved Lower Bounds for LDCs and PIRs
This chapter is based on ”Improved Lower Bounds for Locally Decodable Codes and
Private Information Retrieval”, S. Wehner and R. de Wolf, quant-ph/0403140
5.1 Introduction
Now that we have established the notion of private information retrieval (PIR) and
locally decodable codes (LDC), we can turn to proving new lower bounds for both.
Here we analyze the case where the answer length ` is very large, but the decoder
uses only b bits out of the ` bits that a query gives. The b positions that he uses may
depend on the index i he is interested in, as well as his randomness. For example,
the LDC constructed from the Square PIR scheme in Section 3.2.2 is of this form
with b = 1. Likewise, the Cube PIR scheme from Section 3.2.2 has a large answer
length `, but the user only selects b = 3 bits of each answer. This setting is therefore
interesting because many existing constructions are of this form, for quite small b.
Note again, that Goldreich et al. [47] also analyzed this situation, and showed the
following lower bound for linear codes:
m = 2Ω(n/
∑b
i=0 (
`
i)).
Here we will prove a slightly weaker lower bound for all codes:
m = 2Ω(n/2
b
∑b
i=0 (
`
i)).
In particular, if b = ` the bound from [53] is improved to
m = 2Ω(n/2
2`).
We lose a factor of 2b compared to Goldreich et al. This factor can be dispensed
with if the decoder outputs the parity of a subset of the bits he receives. All known
LDCs are of this type.
Our proofs for LDCs are completely different from the combinatorial approach of
Goldreich et al. Similar to [53], we proceed in several steps: (1) we reduce the LDC
to a smooth code (2) we then reduce the two classical queries to one quantum query
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and (3) show a lower bound for the induced one-quantum-query-decodable code by
deriving a random access code from it. We continue by giving improved bounds for
PIR, by using the relationship between LDCs and PIR established earlier.
The main novelty is a tight analysis of the following problem, which may be of
independent interest: How well can we compute f(a0, a1) given a quantum super-
position 1√
2
(|0, a0〉+ |1, a1〉) of both halves of the input?
5.2 Computing f(a0, a1) from Superposed Input
This analysis is the main tool we will require to prove new lower bounds for LDCs
and PIRs. Consider the state |Ψa0a1〉 = 1√2(|0, a0〉 + |1, a1〉) with a0, a1 both b-bit
strings. We show that we can compute any Boolean function f(a0, a1) with bias
1/2b+1 given one copy of this state. After that we show that bias optimal, if f is
the 2b-bit parity function.
5.2.1 Upper bound
The key to constructing the algorithm is the following observation:
Lemma 5.2.1 For every function f : {0, 1}2b → {0, 1} there exist non-normalized
states |ϕa〉 such that
U : |a〉|0〉 → γ
∑
w∈{0,1}b
(−1)f(w,a)|w〉|0〉+ |ϕa〉|1〉,
with γ = 1/2b, is unitary.
Proof. Let |ψa〉 = γ
∑
w∈{0,1}b(−1)f(w,a)|w〉|0〉+ |ϕa〉|1〉. Recall that U is unitary
if and only if 〈ψa|ψa′〉 = δaa′ for all a, a′. We show that we can choose |ϕa〉 to achieve
this.
First, since 〈w|w′〉 = δww′ and 〈w, 0|ϕa, 1〉 = 0, we have
〈ψa|ψa′〉 = γ2
∑
w∈{0,1}b
(−1)f(w,a)+f(w,a′) + 〈ϕa|ϕa′〉.
Let C denote the 2b × 2b matrix with entries Caa′ = γ2
∑
w∈{0,1}b(−1)f(w,a)+f(w,a
′)
where the indices a and a′ are b-bit strings. From the definition of Caa′ we have
|Caa′ | ≤ 1/2b for γ = 1/2b. Then by [50, Corollary 6.1.5], the largest eigenvalue of
C is
λmax(C) ≤ min

maxa ∑
a′∈{0,1}b
|Caa′ |,max
a′
∑
a∈{0,1}b
|Caa′ |

 ≤ ∑
a∈{0,1}b
1
2b
= 1.
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However, λmax(C) ≤ 1 implies that the Hermitian matrix I −C is positive semidef-
inite and hence, by [50, Corollary 7.2.11], I − C = A†A for some matrix A. Now
define |ϕa〉 to be the ath column of A. Since the matrix C+A†A = I is composed of
all inner products 〈ψa|ψa′〉, we have 〈ψa|ψa′〉 = δaa′ and it follows that U is unitary.
2
Using these observations, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2.2 Suppose f : {0, 1}2b → {0, 1} is a Boolean function. There exists a
quantum algorithm to compute f(a0, a1) with success probability 1/2 + 1/2
b+1 using
one copy of |Ψa0a1〉 = 1√2(|0, a0〉+ |1, a1〉), with a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}b.
Proof. First we extend the state |Ψa0a1〉 by a |0〉-qubit. Let U be as in Lemma 5.2.1.
Applying the unitary transform |0〉〈0| ⊗ I⊗b+1 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ U to |Ψa0a1〉|0〉 gives
1√
2

|0〉|a0〉|0〉+ |1〉

 1
2b
∑
w∈{0,1}b
(−1)f(w,a1)|w〉|0〉+ |ϕa1〉|1〉



 .
Define |Γ〉 = |a0〉|0〉 and |Λ〉 = 12b
∑
w (−1)f(w,a1)|w〉|0〉 + |ϕa1〉|1〉. Then 〈Γ|Λ〉 =
1
2b
(−1)f(a0,a1) and the above state is
1√
2
(|0〉|Γ〉+ |1〉|Λ〉).
We apply a Hadamard transform to the first qubit to get
1
2
(|0〉(|Γ〉+ |Λ〉) + |1〉(|Γ〉 − |Λ〉)) .
The probability that a measurement of the first qubit yields a 0 is
1
4
〈Γ + Λ|Γ + Λ〉 = 1
2
+
1
2
〈Γ|Λ〉 = 1
2
+
(−1)f(a0,a1)
2b+1
.
Thus by measuring the first qubit, we obtain the value of f(a0, a1) with bias 1/2
b+1.
2
To prove that the above algorithm is optimal for the parity function, we need
to consider how well we can distinguish two density matrices ρ0 and ρ1. By distin-
guishing we mean that given an unknown state, we can determine whether it is ρ0
or ρ1. Let ‖ A ‖tr denote the trace norm of matrix A, which equals the sum of its
singular values.
Lemma 5.2.3 Two density matrices ρ0 and ρ1 cannot be distinguished with proba-
bility better than 12 +
‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr
4 .
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Proof. The most general way of distinguishing ρ0 and ρ1 is a POVM with two
operators E0 and E1, such that p0 = tr(ρ0E0) ≥ 1/2 + ε and q0 = tr(ρ1E0) ≤
1/2 − ε. Then |p0 − q0| ≥ 2ε and likewise, |p1 − q1| ≥ 2ε. By [65, Theorem 9.1],
‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr = max{E0,E1}(|p0 − q0|+ |p1 − q1|) and thus ‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr ≥ 4ε. Hence
ε ≤ ‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr/4. 2
Theorem 5.2.4 Suppose that f is the parity of a0a1. Then any quantum algorithm
for computing f from one copy of |Ψa0a1〉 has success probability ≤ 1/2 + 1/2b+1.
Proof. Define ρ0 and ρ1 by
ρc =
1
22b−1
∑
a0a1∈f−1(c)
|Ψa0a1〉〈Ψa0a1 |,
with c ∈ {0, 1}. A quantum algorithm that computes the parity of a0a1 with prob-
ability 1/2 + ε can be used to distinguish ρ0 and ρ1. Hence from Lemma 5.2.3 we
have ε ≤ ‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr/4.
Let A = ρ0 − ρ1. It is easy to see that the |0, a0〉〈0, a0|-entries are the same in
ρ0 and in ρ1, so these entries are 0 in A. Similarly, the |1, a1〉〈1, a1|-entries in A are
0. In the off-diagonal blocks, the |0, a0〉〈1, a1|-entry of A is (−1)|a0|+|a1|/22b. For
|φ〉 = 1√
2b
∑
w∈{0,1}b(−1)|w||w〉 we have
|φ〉〈φ| = 1
2b
∑
a0,a1
(−1)|a0|+|a1||a0〉〈a1|
and hence
A =
1
2b
(|0, φ〉〈1, φ|+ |1, φ〉〈0, φ|).
Let U and V be unitary transforms such that U |0, φ〉 = |0, 0b〉, U |1, φ〉 = |1, 0b〉 and
V |0, φ〉 = |1, 0b〉, V |1, φ〉 = |0, 0b〉. Then
UAV † =
1
2b
(U |0, φ〉〈1, φ|V † + U |1, φ〉〈0, φ|V †) = 1
2b
(|0, 0b〉〈0, 0b|+ |1, 0b〉〈1, 0b|).
Since UAV † is diagonal, its only non-zero singular values are σ1 = σ2 = 1/2b. Hence
‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr = ‖ A ‖tr = ‖ UAV † ‖tr =
∑
i
σi =
2
2b
,
so ε ≤ ‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr/4 = 1/2b+1. 2
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5.3 Lower Bounds for Locally Decodable Codes that
Use Few Bits
We now make use of the technique developed above to prove new lower bounds for
2-query LDCs over non-binary alphabets. First we define the notion of a quantum
smooth code analog to the definition of a classical smooth code provided in Sec-
tion 4.3. We then construct a 1-query quantum smooth code (QSC) from a 2-query
classical smooth code (SC), and then prove lower bounds for QSCs. Finally, we will
use the connection between smooth codes and LDCs to improve the best known
lower bounds for LDCs. In the sequel, we will index the two queries by 0 and 1
instead of 1 and 2, to conform to the two basis states |0〉 and |1〉 of a qubit.
5.3.1 Quantum Smooth Code
We first define the notion of a 1-query quantum smooth code. The following def-
inition is rather ad hoc and not the most general possible, but sufficient for our
purposes.
Definition 5.3.1 C : {0, 1}n → Σm is a (1, c, ε)-quantum smooth code (QSC), if
there exists a quantum decoding algorithm A with input i ∈ [n] and oracle access to
C(x) such that
1. A probabilistically picks a string r, makes a query of the form
|Qir〉 = 1√
2

|j1r〉 1√
2b
∑
T⊆S1r
|zT 〉+ |j2r〉 1√
2b
∑
T⊆S2r
|zT 〉


and returns the outcome of some quantum measurement on the resulting state.
2. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [n] we have Pr[A outputs xi] ≥ 1/2 + ε.
3. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n, i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], Pr[A queries j] ≤ c/m.
The QSC uses b bits, if the sets S1r, S2r have size b.
5.3.2 Constructing a 1-query QSC from a 2-query SC
As the first step of our proof, we turn a 2-query classical smooth code into a 1-query
quantum smooth code.
Theorem 5.3.2 If C : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}`)m is a (2, c, ε)-smooth code that uses b
bits, then C is a (1, c, ε/2b)-quantum smooth code that uses b bits.
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Proof. Fix index i ∈ [n] and encoding y = C(x). The 1-query quantum decoder
will pick a random string r with the same probability as the 2-query classical decoder.
This r determines two indices j0, j1 ∈ [m], two b-element sets S0, S1 ⊆ [`], and a
function f : {0, 1}2b → {0, 1} such that
Pr[f(yj0|S0 , yj1|S1) = xi] = p ≥
1
2
+ ε,
where the probability is taken over the decoder’s randomness. Assume for simplicity
that j0 = 0 and j1 = 1, and define a0 = yj0|S0 and a1 = yj1|S1 . We now construct
a 1-query quantum decoder that outputs f(a0, a1) with probability 1/2+1/2
b+1, as
follows. The quantum query is
|Qir〉 = 1√
2

|0〉 1√
2b
∑
T⊆S0
|zT 〉+ |1〉 1√
2b
∑
T⊆S1
|zT 〉

 .
The result of this query is
1√
2

|0〉 1√
2b
∑
T⊆S0
(−1)a0·T |zT 〉+ |1〉 1√
2b
∑
T⊆S1
(−1)a1·T |zT 〉

 .
We can unitarily transform this to
1√
2
(|0〉|a0〉+ |1〉|a1〉).
By Theorem 5.2.2, we can compute a bit o from this such that Pr[o = f(a0, a1)] =
1/2 + 1/2b+1. The probability of success is then given by
Pr[o = xi] = Pr[o = f(a0, a1)] · Pr[xi = f(a0, a1)] + Pr[o 6= f(a0, a1)] · Pr[xi 6= f(a0, a1)]
=
(
1
2
+
1
2b+1
)
p+
(
1
2
− 1
2b+1
)
(1− p)
=
1
2
− 1
2b+1
+
1
2b
p
≥ 1
2
+
ε
2b
.
Since no j is queried with probability more than c/m by the classical decoder, the
same is true for the quantum decoder. Hence we have constructed a QSC with the
appropriate properties. 2
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5.3.3 Improved Lower Bounds for 2-query LDCs over an `-bit al-
phabet
Our proof of a lower bound for 2-query LDCs uses the notion of a quantum random
access code. That is an encoding x 7→ ρx of n-bit string x into m-qubit states ρx,
such that any bit xi can be recovered with some probability p ≥ 1/2 + ε from ρx.
For the length of such quantum codes there is a known lower bound [64]:
Theorem 5.3.3 (Nayak) An encoding x 7→ ρx of n-bit strings into m-qubit states
with recovery probability at least p has m ≥ (1−H(p))n.
The main ingredient of our proof is the following lemma, which shows how the
query of a QSC gives rise to a quantum random access code. Let u =
∑b
i=0
(
`
i
)
and
define the log(u)-qubit pure states
|U(x)j〉 = 1√
u
∑
|T |≤b
(−1)T ·C(x)j |zT 〉
and the (log(m) + log(u))-qubit states
|U(x)〉 = 1√
m
m∑
j=1
|j〉|U(x)j〉.
Lemma 5.3.4 Suppose C : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}`)m is a (1, c, ε)-quantum smooth code
that uses b bits. Then given one copy of |U(x)〉, there is a quantum algorithm that
outputs ‘fail’ with probability 1 − 2b+1/(cu) with u = ∑bi=0 (`i), but if it succeeds it
outputs xi with probability at least 1/2 + ε.
Proof. Let us fix i ∈ [n]. Suppose the quantum decoder of C makes query |Qir〉
to indices j0r and j1r with probability pr. Consider the following state
|Vi(x)〉 =
∑
r
√
pr|r〉 1√
2
(|j0r〉|U(x)j0r〉+ |j1r〉|U(x)j1r〉) .
We will first show how to obtain |Vi(x)〉 from |U(x)〉 with some probability. Rewrite
|Vi(x)〉 to
|Vi(x)〉 =
m∑
j=1
αj |φj〉|j〉|U(x)j〉,
where the αj are nonnegative reals, and α
2
j ≤ c/(2m) because C is a QSC (the 1/2
comes from the amplitude 1/
√
2). Using the unitary map |0〉|j〉 7→ |φj〉|j〉, we can
obtain |Vi(x)〉 from the state
|V ′i (x)〉 =
m∑
j=1
αj |j〉|U(x)j〉.
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We thus have to show that we can obtain |V ′i (x)〉 from |U(x)〉. To this end, define
operator
M =
√
2m
c
m∑
j=1
αj |j〉〈j| ⊗ I
and consider a POVM with measurement operators M †M and I −M †M . These
operators are both positive because α2j ≤ c/2m. Note that, up to normalization,
M |U(x)〉 = |V ′i (x)〉. The probability that the measurement succeeds (i.e. takes us
from |U(x)〉 to |V ′i (x)〉) is
〈U(x)|M †M |U(x)〉 = 2m
c
〈U(x)|

∑
j
α2j |j〉〈j| ⊗ I

 |U(x)〉 = 2
c
∑
j
α2j =
2
c
Now given |Vi(x)〉 we can measure r, and then project the last register onto the sets
S0r and S1r that we need for |Qir〉, by means of the measurement operator
|j0r〉〈j0r| ⊗
∑
T⊆S0r
|T 〉〈T |+ |j1r〉〈j1r| ⊗
∑
T⊆S1r
|T 〉〈T |.
This measurement succeeds with probability 2b/u, but if it succeeds we have the
state corresponding to the answer to query |Qir〉, from which we can predict xi.
Putting everything together, we succeed with probability (2b/u) · (2/c), and if we
succeed, we output xi with probability 1/2 + ε. 2
We can avoid failures by taking many copies of |U(x)〉:
Lemma 5.3.5 If C : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}`)m is a (1, c, ε)-quantum smooth code, then
|W (x)〉 = |U(x)〉⊗cu/2b+1 is a cu(log(m)+ log(u))/2b+1-qubit random access code for
x with recovery probability 1/2 + ε/2 where u =
∑b
i=0
(
`
i
)
.
Proof. We do the experiment from the previous lemma on each copy of |U(x)〉
independently. The probability that each experiment fails is (1−2b+1/(cu))cu/2b+1 ≤
1/2. In that case we output a fair coin flip. If at least one experiment succeeds,
we can predict xi with probability 1/2 + ε. This gives success probability at least
1
2
(
1
2 + ε
)
+
(
1
2
)2
= 12 +
ε
2 . 2
Armed with these tricks, we can finally prove the lower bound for 2-query smooth
codes and LDCs over non-binary alphabets.
Theorem 5.3.6 If C : {0, 1}n → Σm = ({0, 1}`)m is a (2, c, ε)-smooth code where
the decoder uses only b bits of each answer, then
m ≥ 2dn−log(u)
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for d = (1 − H(1/2 + ε/2b+1))2b+1/(cu) = Θ(ε2/(2bcu)) and u = ∑bi=0 (`i). In
particular, m = 2Ω(ε
2n/(22`c)) if b = `.
Proof. Theorem 5.3.2 implies that C is a (1, c, ε/2b)-quantum smooth code.
Lemma 5.3.5 gives us a random access code of cu(log(m)+ log(u))/2b+1 qubits with
recovery probability p = 1/2+ε/2b+1. Finally, the random access code lower bound,
Theorem 5.3.3, implies cu(log(m) + log(u))/2b+1 ≥ (1 −H(p))n. Rearranging and
using that 1−H(1/2 + η) = Θ(η2) gives the result. 2
Since a (2, δ, ε)-LDC is a (2, 2/δ, ε)-smooth code (Theorem 4.3.2), we obtain the
main result:
Corollary 5.3.7 If C : {0, 1}n → Σm = ({0, 1}`)m is a (2, δ, ε)-locally decodable
code, then
m ≥ 2dn−log(u)
for d = (1−H(1/2+ε/2b+1))δ2b/u = Θ(δε2/(2bu)) and u =∑bi=0 (`i). In particular,
m = 2Ω(δε
2n/22`) if b = `.
In all known non-trivial constructions of LDCs and smooth codes, the decoder
outputs the parity of the bits that he is interested in. In this case we can prove a
slightly stronger bound.
Theorem 5.3.8 If C : {0, 1}n → Σm = ({0, 1}`)m is a (2, c, ε)-smooth code where
the decoder outputs f(g(a0|S0), g(a1|S1)), with f : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1} and g : {0, 1}b →
{0, 1} fixed functions, then
m ≥ 2dn−log(`′)
for d = Ω(ε2/(c`′)) and `′ =
(
`
b
)
.
Proof. We can transform C into a smooth code C ′ : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}`′)m with
`′ =
(
`
b
)
by defining C ′(x)j to be the value of g on all
(
`
b
)
possible b-subsets of the
original ` bits of C(x)j . Now we are interested in b
′ = 1 bit of each C ′(x)j . The
result then follows from Theorem 5.3.6. 2
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5.4.1 Lower Bounds for 2-server PIRs that use few bits
Here we derive improved lower bounds for 2-server PIRs from our LDC bounds. We
use Lemma 4.4.1 from Goldreich et al. [47, Lemma 7.1] to translate PIR schemes
to smooth codes. We then combine this lemma with Theorem 5.3.6 to obtain the
following theorem. This slightly improves the lower bound given in [53] and extends
it to the case where we only use b bits out of each server reply.
52 Improved Lower Bounds for LDCs and PIRs
Theorem 5.4.1 A classical 2-server (1− η)-secure PIR scheme with t-bit queries,
`-bit answers that uses b bits and has recovery probability 1/2 + ε satisfies
t = Ω
(
n(ε− η)2
2bu
)
with u =
∑b
i=0
(
`
i
)
. In particular, if all bits of the answer are used, then t = Ω(n(ε−
η)2/22`).
Proof. Using Lemma 4.4.1 we turn the PIR scheme into a (2, 3, ε−η)-smooth code
C : {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}`)m that uses b bits of ` where m ≤ 6 · 2t. From Theorem 5.3.6
we have m ≥ 2dn−a with d = Θ((ε− η)2/(2bu)). 2
If b is fixed, ε = 1/2 and η = 0, the above bound simplifies to t = Ω(n/`b), hence
Corollary 5.4.2 A 2-server PIR scheme with t-bit queries and `-bit answers has
total communication
C = 2(t+ `) = Ω
(
n
1
b+1
)
.
For b = 1 this gives C = Ω(
√
n), which is achieved by the square scheme of
Section 3.2.2. For b = 3 we get C = Ω(n1/4), which is close to the C = O(n1/3) of
the cube scheme of Section 3.2.2.
As in Theorem 5.3.8, we can get slightly better bounds for PIR schemes where
the user just outputs the parity of b bits from each answer. All known non-trivial
PIR schemes have this property.
Corollary 5.4.3 If the PIR’s user outputs f(g(a0|S0), g(a1|S1)), for fixed f and g,
then
t = Ω
(
n(ε− η)2(
`
b
)
)
.
5.4.2 Weak Lower Bounds for general 2-server PIR
The previous lower bounds on the query length of 2-server PIR schemes were signifi-
cant only for protocols that use few bits from each answer. Here we slightly improve
the best known bound of 4.4 log n [53] on the overall communication complexity of
2-server PIR schemes, by combining our Theorem 5.4.1 and Theorem 6 of Katz and
Trevisan [52]. We restate their theorem for the PIR setting, assuming for simplicity
that ε = 1/2 and η = 0.
Theorem 5.4.4 (Katz & Trevisan) Every 2-server PIR scheme with t-bit queries
and `-bit answers has
t ≥ 2 log n
`
−O(1).
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We now prove the following lower bound on the total communication C = 2(t+`)
of any 2-server PIR scheme with t-bit queries and `-bit answers:
Theorem 5.4.5 Every 2-server PIR scheme has total communication
C ≥ (5− o(1)) log n.
Proof. We distinguish three cases, depending on the answer length. Let δ =
log log n/ logn.
case 1: ` ≤ (0.5−δ) logn. Then from Theorem 5.4.1 we get that C ≥ t = Ω(n2δ) =
Ω((log n)2).
case 2: (0.5− δ) logn < ` < 2.5 log n. Then from Theorem 5.4.4 we have
C = 2(t+`) > 2 (2 log(n/(2.5 log n))−O(1) + (0.5− δ) logn) = (5− o(1)) log n.
case 3: ` ≥ 2.5 log n. Then C = 2(t+ `) ≥ 5 log n.
2
5.5 Quantum PIRs from classical PIR with non-binary
answers
Using the tricks employed for LDCs above, we can construct a 2-server quantum
PIR scheme from a 4-server classical PIR scheme that uses b bits, as follows. The
user flips his randomness as in the classical scheme. This fixes queries q0,q1,q2,q3 as
well as sets S0,S1,S2,S3 of b-bit indices to use from answers a0,a1,a2,a3 respectively.
He now picks random permutations pi1,pi2,pi3 on the set of all
(
`
b
)
b-element subsets
from an `-element set, such that pi1(S0) = S1, pi2(S0) = S2 and pi3(S0) = S3. The
user then constructs the following quantum state
1√(
`
b
) ∑
|T |=b
|T 〉

 1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉|q0〉|T 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server 1
|1〉|q1〉|pi1(T )〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server 2
+|1〉 |2〉|q2〉|pi2(T )〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server 1
|3〉|q3〉|pi3(T )〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server 2
)

 .
He keeps the first two registers to himself and sends the rest to the two quantum
servers as indicated. Each server now only sees a random mixture over the classical
queries and a random T . This means that if he were to measure the query, he would
only obtain one classical query qj . Thus the privacy of the 4-server scheme carries
over to the quantum scheme. Each server tags on b |0〉-qubits, maps
|j〉|qj〉|T 〉|0b〉 7→ |j〉|qj〉|T 〉|aj|T 〉
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and sends everything back. The user now measures the first register, hoping to
obtain T = S0. He succeeds with probability 1/
(
`
b
)
. He can then unitarily remove
the Sj and qj to get
1√
2
(|0〉|a0|S0〉|a1|S1〉+ |1〉|a2|S2〉|a3|S3〉).
From this he can compute f(a0|S0 , a1|S1 , a2|S2 , a3|S3) with probability 1/2 + 1/2
2b+1
using Theorem 5.2.2. The expected number of repetitions (in parallel) before success
is
(
`
b
)
. This means that if we can construct 4-server classical PIR schemes where
(
`
b
)
is
quite small, then we obtain an efficient 2-server quantum PIR scheme. For example,
if there exists a 4-server classical PIR scheme with t, ` = O(n1/8), using only b = 1
bits from each of the 4 answers, then we obtain a 2-server quantum PIR scheme with
an expected number of O(n1/4) qubits of communication and recovery probability
close to 1. Currently, the best known 2-server quantum PIR communicates O(n3/10)
qubits [53].
5.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we improved the best known lower bounds on the length of 2-query
locally decodable codes and the communication complexity of 2-server private in-
formation retrieval schemes. Our bounds are significant whenever the decoder uses
only few bits from the two query answers, even if the alphabet (LDC case) or answer
length (PIR case) is large. This contrasts with the earlier results of Kerenidis and
de Wolf [53], which become trivial even for logarithmic alphabet or answer length,
and those of Goldreich et al. [47], which only apply to linear schemes.
Still, general lower bounds without constraints on alphabet or answer size com-
pletely elude us. Clearly, this is one of the main open questions in this area. Barring
that, we could at least improve the dependence on b of our current bounds. For exam-
ple, a PIR lower bound like t = Ω(n/`db/2e) might be feasible using some additional
quantum tricks. Such a bound for instance implies that the total communication
is Ω(n1/3) for b = 3, which would show that the Cube scheme of Section 3.2.2 is
optimal. Another question is to obtain strong lower bounds for the case of k ≥ 3
queries or servers. For this case, no superpolynomial lower bounds are known even
if the alphabet or answer size is only one bit. Finally, our constructions motivate
the search for 4-server classical PIR schemes with fairly large answer length `, but
using very few bits from each answer. As explained in Section 5.5, such schemes
would give better 2-server quantum PIR schemes.
Part II
Anonymous Transmissions
55
Chapter 6
Anonymous Transmissions
6.1 Introduction
Primitives to hide the sender and recipient of a transmission have received consider-
able attention in classical computing. Such protocols allow any member of a group
to send and receive messages anonymously, even if all physical transmissions can be
monitored.
In the previous part of this text, we have examined the notion of private in-
formation retrieval. PIR allows a user to query a database without revealing the
requested index to the database. However, the database still learns the identity
of the user. This poses a different problem: Consider again the case of a patent
database we encountered in Section 3.1. PIR can ensure that the database does not
gain any information about the nature of the patent query, but it does not conceal
the identity of the user. This may allow a malicious database to conclude that the
user has completed some part of his research or gained a new insight, which in itself
can be valuable information. It is therefore desirable to hide the identity of the user,
as well as the requested index.
Primitives for anonymous transmissions also play an important role in proto-
cols for electronic auctions [76], voting protocols and sending anonymous email [27].
Other applications allow users to access the Internet without revealing their own
identity [71], [36] or, in combination with private information retrieval, provide
anonymous publishing [39]. Finally, an anonymous broadcast channel which is
completely immune to any active attacks, would be a powerful primitive. Alpern
and Schneider [3] showed how two parties can use such a channel to perform key-
exchange.
Outline
First we define the notions of anonymity and untraceability. We then take a look
at some of the known classical protocols. In particular, we examine the Dining
Cryptographers problem [28].
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6.2 Definitions
In most cryptographic applications, we are interested in ensuring the secrecy of data.
Sender and recipient know each other, but are trying to protect their message ex-
change from prying eyes. Anonymity, however, is the secrecy of identity. Looking at
message transmissions in particular, this means that a sender stays anonymous, if no
one can determine his identity within the set of possible senders. The recipient of the
message himself should not learn the sender’s identity either. During the following
discussions, we will refer to the n members of a group V of senders and recipients as
participants or players. Let P (sk) be all of the communication during a run of the
protocol P where player k sends message s. Similarly, let P (rk) denote a run of the
protocol P where player k receives message r. Furthermore, let Pr(i = k|P (sk)) be
the probability that player i was the sender given P (sk), where the probabilities are
taken over the protocols behavior. We define for the case of unconditional security
Definition 6.2.1 A protocol P allows a sender to be anonymous, if for an adversary
∀i, j, k ∈ V : Pr(i = k|P (sk)) = Pr(j = k|P (sk)).
Similarly, if we now let Pr(i = k|P (rk)) denote the probability that player i is the
receiver given P (rk), we can define
Definition 6.2.2 A protocol P allows a recipient to be anonymous, if for an adver-
sary ∀i, j, k ∈ V : Pr(i = k|P (rk)) = Pr(j = k|P (rk)).
We can now define the notion of anonymous message transmissions:
Definition 6.2.3 Anonymous transmissions are transmissions of data, where sender
and recipient are anonymous.
Note that protocols to hide the sender and recipient do not protect message contents.
It is implicitly assumed that the message data itself does not contain any compro-
mising information. Furthermore, we will make use of the following expressions.
Definition 6.2.4 If a participant is anonymous after interactions with the other
participants by sending messages, we speak of untraceability of a participant.
Definition 6.2.5 A protocol that allows the sender of a message to remain anony-
mous achieves sender untraceability. If the recipient of a message stays anonymous,
we speak of recipient untraceability.
Several participants may try to work together in order to trace the sender of
a certain message. As in the case of PIR, we call such a collaboration a collusion
of participants. Here, however, an adversary is additionally allowed to monitor all
physical transmissions. This means he can follow the path of all messages, reading
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and changing them as desired. An attacker that is restricted to observing the net-
work is called passive. If he can also change messages passing over the network, we
refer to him as an active attacker. All known protocols for anonymous transmissions
achieving information theoretic security need a reliable broadcast channel. This type
of channel is also required by our quantum protocol for anonymous transmissions
presented in the next chapter. Achieving broadcast in the presence of dishonest par-
ties turns out to be an extremely difficult problem, even though it seems deceptively
easy at first sight. Lamport, Shostak and Pease [57] considered this problem under
the name of the Byzantine Generals Problem. More formally, reliable broadcast is
defined [40] as
Definition 6.2.6 (FGMR) A protocol among n players such that one distinct
player s (the sender) holds an input value xs ∈ D (for some finite domain D) and
all players eventually decide on an output value in D is said to achieve broadcast
(or Byzantine Agreement) if the protocol guarantees that all correct players decide
on the same output value y ∈ D, and that y = xs whenever the sender is correct.
Lamport et al. [57] showed that perfectly secure broadcast is achievable if and
only if less than a third of the players are corrupted. Fitzi and Maurer [41] showed
that if broadcast is possible among each subset of three participants, then global
broadcast is possible if and only if less than half of the players are corrupted. If
broadcast is possible in a stage preceding the actual protocol, Pfitzmann and Waid-
ner [70] showed that broadcast can later be achieved if only a single participant is
honest. A slightly weaker notion is that of detectable, or weak broadcast [40]. This
variant is sufficient for our purposes.
Definition 6.2.7 (FGMR) A protocol among n players such that one distinct player
s (the sender) holds an input value xs ∈ D and all players eventually decide on an
output value D∪{⊥} (with ⊥ 6= D) is said to achieve weak broadcast (or detectable
broadcast) if the protocol guarantees the following conditions:
• If a correct player decides on some value y ∈ D then all correct players decide
on a value in {y,⊥}.
• If the sender is correct then all correct players decide on y = xs.
We can interpret ⊥ as “abort”. Thus in detectable broadcast, either all honest
players agree on same value y or they abort the protocol. Analog to the this notion
of broadcast in message passing networks, we also define:
Definition 6.2.8 A protocol achieves anonymous broadcast if it achieves broadcast
where the sender remains anonymous.
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6.3 Known Protocols
A considerable number of schemes have been suggested for anonymous transmissions.
They can be divided into three basic classes: First of all there are protocols which
employ a trusted third party. In practice this takes the form of a trusted proxy server
[6], [49], forwarding messages while masking the identity of the original sender.
Secondly, there are protocols using a chain of forwarding servers. Most notably
these are protocols based on so-called mixing techniques introduced by Chaum [27],
such as Webmixes [21] and ISDN-Mixes [68]. Here messages are passed through a
number of untrusted proxies which reorder the messages; hence the name MixNet.
The goal of this reordering is to ensure an observer cannot match in- and outgoing
messages and thus cannot track specific messages on their way through the network.
Public Key Encryption is then used between the user and the different forwarding
servers to hide the contents of a message. Several implemented systems, such as
Mixmaster [63], PipeNet [36] and Onion Routing [78] employ layered encryption:
the user successively encrypts the message with the public keys of all forwarding
servers in the chain. Each server then “peels off” one layer, by decrypting the
received data with its own secret key, to determine the next hop to pass the message
to. The Crowds [71] system takes another approach. Here each player acts as a
forwarding server himself. He either sends the message directly to the destination,
or passes it on to another forwarding server with a certain probability. The aim is to
make any sender within the group appear equally probable for an outside observer.
Various other protocols using forwarding techniques are known. Since our focus
lies on the final class of protocols, we restrict ourselves to this brief introduction.
More information can be found in the papers by Goldberg and Wagner [46], [45].
An extensive overview of known techniques and protocols is also given in the PhD
thesis of D. Martin [61, Chapter 2 and 3].
Finally there is a class of protocols which does not make use of either a trusted
third party or other forms of message forwarding. These protocols are based on
shared resources and communication among all the participating parties, which
makes them difficult to implement on a large scale in practice. Unlike the other
classes of protocols, however, they do not suffer from malicious forwarding servers.
The most well-known of these is the Dining Cryptographers protocol introduced by
Chaum [28] of which we give a brief overview below. A network based on this pro-
tocol is also referred to as a DC-net. Small scale practical implementations of this
protocol are known [61]. In contrast to schemes based on public key cryptography,
a DC-net provides unconditional security.
6.3.1 Dining Cryptographers
Since our protocol in the next chapter was inspired by the Dining Cryptographers
Problem, we briefly review the original dinner table scenario: A group of cryptog-
raphers is assembled around a dinner table in their favorite restaurant. They have
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already made arrangements with the restaurant owner to pay the bill anonymously.
However, they are curious whether one of them is paying or if perhaps the NSA pays.
They agree on the following protocol: Each of them secretly flips a coin behind the
menu with both of his neighbors at the table and adds the outcomes of both coin
flips. He then loudly announces the outcome of the sum. The person paying, how-
ever, adds a 1 to his outcome before the announcement. All the dinner guests can
now calculate the total sum of the announced bits. The sum equals 1 if one of the
cryptographers is paying and 0 otherwise.
Let’s see how this works out for cryptographers A, B and C in Figure 6.1. Let
ri,j denote the outcome of the coin flip between i and j. In our example, B wants
rA,B
rC,A
rB,C
A
B
C aA = rC,A ⊕ rA,B
aB = rA,B ⊕ rB,C ⊕ b
aC = rB,C ⊕ rC,A
aA ⊕ aB ⊕ aC = b
Figure 6.1: Dining Cryptographers Problem
to anonymously send bit b = 1. Everyone computes the sum of their private shared
random bits, where B adds b to his sum. They then broadcast their outcomes.
Anyone, including A, can now compute the total sum of the announcements which
gives aA ⊕ aB ⊕ aC = b, since every shared random bit occurs exactly twice in the
sum. Anonymity is preserved, since A does not know the value of rB,C and can
therefore not determine whether B or C was the sender. The same holds for C by
a similar argument.
Protocol
This scenario can be generalized by viewing the participants as nodes in an undi-
rected graph. We will from now on use the notions of “nodes in a key-sharing graph”
and “participants” interchangeably. Similarly, we will speak of edges, keys and pri-
vate shared random bits to denote the same object.
Definition 6.3.1 The undirected graph G = (V,E) is called the key-sharing graph
of a DC-net if
• Each node in V represents exactly one of the participants.
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• There is an edge between two nodes i and j if and only if i and j privately
share one random bit ri,j.
For example, in the round-table scenario depicted in Figure 6.1, the set of nodes
is V = {A,B,C} and the edges are given by E = {{A,B}, {B,C}, {C,A}}. Each
node has degree 2, as each participant shares a random bit with each of his neighbors.
We can summarize this protocol below. Let n be the total number of nodes.
Furthermore d ≥ 2 denotes the degree of the nodes in the key-sharing graph. Let
ri,j = rj,i denote the private shared random bit associated with the edge connecting
nodes i and j. We furthermore assume that participants do not collude.
Protocol 2: Dining Cryptographers
1: The sending node s computes as = b⊕
⊕
{s,k}∈E(rs,k)
2: Each other node j computes aj =
⊕
{j,k}∈E(rj,k)
3: Each node j broadcasts aj
4: Each recipient now calculates the outcome b =
⊕n
j=1(aj)
Sender untraceability is achieved, since each participant remains uncertain about
at least one random bit in each announcement. A formal proof can be found in [28].
Clearly recipient untraceability is already achieved by the broadcast. Everybody
can compute the resulting sum, so any one of them could act as the true receiving
party. For the announcement we require n uses of a detectable broadcast channel.
Boykin [23] considered a quantum protocol to transmit classical information
anonymously where the participants share EPR pairs instead. The necessary private
shared random bits are then distilled from the shared EPR pairs.
An important requirement of the DC-net model is a reliable broadcast channel.
If one of the participants is able to send a different value to each neighbor, he
can potentially subvert the protocol. For example one of the participants could
intentionally lie to some of the other participants during the announcement phase.
This will simply disrupt the protocol, if messages are flowing in only one direction.
If, however, the recipient reacts to messages by sending a reply, this can allow such
an active attacker to identify the recipient later on [82]: Consider for example the
graph above with participants A, B and C and suppose that the receiver simply
echoes back any messages he receives. Suppose A is malicious and tries to find out
whether the real receiver is B or C. Of course, both B and C receive the broadcast
outcome, however, we assume that only one of them actually intends to receive
messages. For example, one of them could be a server waiting to process requests.
In the first round A will make sure he sends a different bit to B and C. This means
that B and C will compute a different value for outcome b. A, on the other hand,
receives all the correct messages and can compute the proper b. In the next round
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B or C will reply. A can now simply observe the outcome to determine who was the
receiving party in the previous round.
Noting that it is sufficient if all honest parties either receive the same broadcast
value or abort, a DC-net is also secure using a detectable broadcast by Maurer et
al. [40]. A number of additions have also been made to the original protocol to remove
the dependence on a reliable broadcast channel altogether [82], [84]. However, they
offer only computational security.
Collisions and Disruptions
The above protocol works if only a single person tries to send. If multiple participants
try to send at the same time, collisions occur. Chaum [28] presents a simple collision
detection protocol based on ALOHA [79]: If a participant notices that the outcome
of the broadcast is different from what he intended to send, he simply resends after
waiting a random number of rounds. Other approaches for collision detection and
slot reservation for DC type channels have also been considered by Pfitzmann [69]
and Waidner et al. [82].
Another disadvantage of the protocol lies in its vulnerability to denial of service
attacks, because a malicious participant can jam the channel by repeated sending
of information. Classically various approaches offering computational security have
been considered to thwart these attacks [83], [28]. An overview about the problems
associated with regulating channel access in a DC-net is also given in the PhD thesis
of A. Pfitzmann [69].
Collusions of Participants
What happens, if some of the n participants decide to work together to trace back the
sender? The effect of collusions depends highly on the connectivity of the key-sharing
graph G. Unless G is fully connected, malicious nodes can partition the graph into
multiple disjoint sets. This allows them to compute the sum of announcements in
each such partition individually. By comparing the individual sums with the total
sum of the network, they can determine which partition of the graph a transmission
originated in. To see how this works, consider the following example depicted in
Figure 6.2.
Recall that each edge represents one bit of private shared randomness. If M and
E now pool their resources and work together, they can compute the announcements
of both partitions of the graph separately. In the example of Figure 6.2 they compute
the outcome of the right partition aB ⊕ aC ⊕ aD ⊕ rMB ⊕ rEC = b1 and the left
partition aA⊕ rAM ⊕ rAE = b2. They then compute b1⊕ b2 = b to obtain the overall
outcome. From b1 = b they can now immediately conclude that A sent bit b. Thus
by partitioning the key-sharing graph, they can restrict the identity of the sender to
a much smaller set of participants.
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M
E
A
B
C
D
rM,B
rE,C
rA,M
rA,E
Figure 6.2: Collusions of participants (here M and E) can partition the key-sharing
graph
The number of malicious collaborators we can tolerate is thus directly depen-
dent on the form of G. Only a fully connected key-sharing graph can withstand
partitioning if up to n− 2 participants are working together.
Resources
The fundamental resource used by the DC-net is private shared randomness between
the participants. How many of these shared random bits do we need?
We first note that for any protocol P that achieves sender untraceability, where
the only resource used by the n participating parties is pairwise private shared
randomness, the form of the key-sharing graph G = (V,E) is important. More
formally we can say that
Lemma 6.3.2 In any protocol P to achieve anonymous broadcast among n players,
where the only resource available to the participants is pairwise private shared ran-
domness, a broadcast channel and classical communication, a particular collusion of
t participants can break the sender’s anonymity, if the corresponding collection of t
nodes partitions the key-sharing graph G = (V,E).
Proof. t colluding nodes partition the key-sharing graph into s disjoint sets of
nodes {S1, . . . , Ss} = N . As there is no edge connecting any of these sets, these
sets do not share any private randomness. Now suppose that anonymous broadcast
is still possible. Let Si, Sj ∈ N be two arbitrary sets of nodes in N . Any node
i ∈ Si can now establish a key with a node j ∈ Sj using anonymous broadcast [3]:
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Nodes i and j each generate n random bits: r1i , . . . , r
n
i and r
1
j , . . . , r
n
j . Node i now
announces n messages of the form: “Bit bk is r
k
i ” for 1 ≤ k ≤ n using the protocol
for anonymous broadcast. Likewise, node j announces “Bit bk is r
k
j ” for 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Nodes i and j now discard all bits for which rki = r
k
j and use the remaining bits
as a key. Note that an adversary can only learn whether bk = r
k
i or bk = r
k
j if the
two announcements are the same. If rki 6= rkj , the adversary does not learn who has
which bit.
However, since the view of an adversary in our model includes all communica-
tion, members of different sets in N cannot establish a shared key to communicate
with each other securely using only classical communication [20]. Thus the sender’s
anonymity can be broken if the graph can be partitioned. 2
Furthermore, note that each player j needs to privately share one bit of random-
ness with at least two other participants or his anonymity can be compromised. We
can phrase this in terms of the key-sharing graph as
Corollary 6.3.3 Each node j ∈ V of the key-sharing graph G = (V,E), used by a
protocol P for anonymous transmissions, where the only resource available to the n
participants is pairwise private shared randomness, a broadcast channel and classical
communication, must have degree d ≥ 2.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary, that an arbitrary node j has degree 1: it has only
one outgoing edge to another node k. Clearly, node k can partition the key-sharing
graph into two disjoint sets S1 = {j} and S2 = V \ {j, k}. By Lemma 6.3.2, node k
can then break j’s anonymity. 2
Corollary 6.3.4 Any protocol P that achieves anonymous broadcast, where no play-
ers collude and the only resource available to the n participants is pairwise private
shared randomness, a broadcast channel and classical communication, needs at least
n bits of pairwise private shared randomness.
Proof. Consider again the key-sharing graph G = (V,E). Suppose on the contrary,
that only k < n bits of private shared randomness are used. Then there must be at
least one node of degree 1 in the graph. Thus by Corollary 6.3.3 at least n bits of
private shared randomness are necessary. 2
Corollary 6.3.5 Any protocol P that achieves anonymous broadcast and is resistant
against collusions of t < n− 1 malicious players, where the only resources available
to the n participants are pairwise private shared randomness, a broadcast channel
and classical communication, needs at least n(n− 1) bits of pairwise private shared
randomness.
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Proof. Again consider the key-sharing graph G. Suppose on the contrary, that
only k < n(n− 1) bits of private shared randomness are used. However, then there
are only k < n(n − 1) edges in a graph of n nodes. Then G is not fully connected
and there is a set of t = n − 2 colluding nodes which can partition the key-sharing
graph. By Lemma 6.3.2, they can then break the sender’s anonymity. Thus n(n−1)
bits of pairwise private shared random bits are necessary to tolerate up to t < n− 1
colluding players. 2
These observations will become useful in the next chapter, when we consider a
different resource which can be used to solve the problem: shared entanglement.
6.3.2 Secure Function Evaluation
Chaum and Cre´peau [29] later also considered the problem of secure function evalu-
ation (SFE), also called Secure Multi-Party Computation. In this setting, n partici-
pants want to compute a function f of their inputs b1, b2, . . . , bn, such that each party
learns the value of f(b1, . . . , bn) without revealing more about their input bit then
can be inferred from this value itself. The DC-net thus forms a special case of secure
function evaluation where f is the parity function. The input of player i is bi = 0,
if he doesn’t wish to send, and bi = 1 otherwise. Secure Multi-Party computation is
without doubt the more interesting problem. Nevertheless, we consider this special
case later on, since our protocol is intuitively much simpler then protocols for the
general case. Anonymous transmission itself, however, can be a separate primitive
which may be implemented by fundamentally different approaches, as practical im-
plementations show. Furthermore, more efficient protocols may be possible in this
restricted scenario [81].
Cre´peau et al. [35] recently also considered the case of secure function evaluation
using quantum states as inputs. Clearly in the quantum setting there is no notion
of broadcast as in classical computing.
6.4 Summary
We have examined the notion of anonymous transmission, which allows message ex-
change where sender and recipient remain anonymous. There are numerous classical
protocols for this problem, most of which offer computational security. We have also
taken a closer look at the Dining Cryptographers protocol, which is unconditionally
secure given a reliable broadcast channel. Secure Function Evaluation or Secure
Multi-Party Communication allows implementation of a DC-net without detection
of disruptors. We note that all classical protocols allow reconstruction of the sender,
once all privately held keys are collected by a single party. For example in a DC-net,
we can always trace back the sender later on, once we acquire knowledge of all keys
ri,j in the network.
Chapter 7
A Quantum Protocol for Anonymous Transmissions
with Perfect Repudiation
7.1 Introduction
Here we introduce new quantum protocols to send and receive classical and quantum
bits anonymously. We first consider a protocol that allows n participants to send
and receive one bit of classical information anonymously using one shared entangled
state |Ψ〉 = (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2 and n uses of a detectable broadcast channel as defined
in Section 6.2. Like the original DC-net, the quantum protocol achieves anonymous
broadcast. Our protocol is secure against collusions of up to n − 2 participants.
This means that the collaborators cannot learn anything more by working together
and pooling their resources. The main advantage of our protocol over the classical
protocols is that it prevents later reconstruction of the sender and thus achieves
perfect repudiation: None of the participants are able to prove the identity of a
sender at a later point in time. This contrasts with all known classical protocols we
examined in the last chapter.
Clearly we would also like to transmit qubits anonymously. We first use our
protocol to allow two anonymous parties to establish a shared EPR pair. Finally,
we use this form of anonymous entanglement to hide the sender and recipient of an
arbitrary qubit. These protocols use the same resource of shared entangled states
|Ψ〉 and a detectable broadcast channel.
If multiple participants want to send simultaneously, collisions can occur. Using
the same fundamental resource of shared states, we create a dlogne-round quantum
protocol to detect all collisions in advance. Each of these rounds uses one entangled
state |Ψ〉.
Our protocol provides an example of a scenario where we can trade in O(n2)
private pairwise shared random bits used classically for one n-qubit shared entangled
state |Ψ〉. Interestingly, this is a state equally shared by all participants, whereas the
classical random bits are shared privately between each pair of participants. This
shows that, for certain applications, globally shared entanglement may not only be
traded in for shared randomness, but also for private shared randomness among the
participants.
67
68 A Quantum Protocol for Anonymous Transmissions with Perfect Repudiation
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 Quantum Resources
The fundamental resource used in our protocol are n-party shared entangled states
of the form
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0n〉+ |1n〉).
By “shared”we mean that each of the n participants holds exactly one qubit of |Ψ〉.
They could have obtained these states at an earlier meeting or distribute and test
them later on.
The key observation used in our protocols is the fact that phase flips and rotations
applied by the individual participants have the same effect on the global state no
matter who applied them. Consider for example the phase flip defined by
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
If player number i applies this transformation to his state, the global transformation
is
Ui = I
⊗i−1 ⊗ Z ⊗ In−i.
We now have ∀i, Ui|Ψ〉 = (|0n〉− |1n〉)/
√
2. Note that this effect takes place “instan-
taneously” and no communication is necessary.
7.2.2 Definitions and Model
We use the general notions of anonymity as defined in Section 6.2. Our model
assumes that the n participants have access to the following resources
1. An n-qubit shared entangled state |Ψ〉 = (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2.
2. A channel providing at least detectable broadcast.
We require our protocol to satisfy the following conditions
1. If all participants are honest, then the protocol achieves sender and recipient
untraceability.
2. If one or more players are malicious, they can at most disrupt the protocol,
but are not able to learn anything about the sender’s or recipient’s identity.
Here, we call a participant “honest” if he follows the protocol, and “dishonest” oth-
erwise as in Section 2.1. If he is trying to disrupt the channel, we will also call him
“malicious”. We require our protocols to be unconditionally secure, as opposed to
protocols where the security is based on computational constraints.
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7.3 Sending Classical Bits
First of all we present a protocol to transmit a classical bit b anonymously, if all n
participants share an n-qubit entangled state |Ψ〉. For now we assume that only one
person wants to transmit in each round of the protocol and deal with the case of
multiple senders later on.
7.3.1 Protocol
Let’s return to the original dinner table scenario described in Section 6.3.1. Suppose
Alice, one of the dinner guests, wishes to broadcast a bit b anonymously. For this
she uses the following protocol:
Protocol 3: ANON(b)
Prerequisite: Shared state (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2
1: Alice applies a phase flip Z to her part of the state if b = 1 and does
nothing otherwise.
2: Each participant (incl. Alice):
- Applies a Hadamard transform to his qubit.
- Measures his qubit in the computational basis.
- Broadcasts his measurement result.
- Counts the total number of 1’s, k, in the n measurement outcomes.
- If k is even, he concludes b = 0, otherwise b = 1.
7.3.2 Analysis
Correctness
Since Alice applies the phase flip Z depending on the value of the bit b she wishes
to transmit, the participants obtain the state (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2 if b = 0 and (|0n〉 −
|1n〉)/√2 if b = 1. By tracing out the other players’ part of the state as in Sec-
tion 1.3.5, we can see that no player can determine on his own whether the phase
of the global state has changed. We therefore require the players to first apply a
Hadamard transform to their qubit. This changes the global state such that we get
a superposition of all strings x ∈ {0, 1}n with an even number of 1’s for no phase
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flip and an odd number of 1’s if a phase flip has been applied:
H⊗n
(
1√
2
(|0n〉+ (−1)b|1n〉)
)
=
1√
2n+1

 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉+ (−1)b
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(−1)|x||x〉


=
1√
2n+1
∑
x∈{0,1}n
(1 + (−1)b⊕|x|)|x〉
This means that we expect an even number of 1’s if b = 0 and an odd number of
1’s if b = 1. The players now measure their part of the state, and announce their
measurement outcome. This allows each participant to compute the number of 1’s
in the global outcome, and thus the value of b. Broadcasting all measurement results
requires n uses of a broadcast channel.
Note that if we had multiple senders, this protocol computes the parity of all their
input bits, without revealing their individual inputs. Thus, ANON also performs
secure function evaluation on n inputs, if the function is parity.
Security
As we noticed in Section 7.2, the resulting global state is independent of the identity
of the person applying the phase flip. A phase flip is applied locally, so no transmis-
sions are necessary to change the global state. Therefore an adversary monitoring
the network cannot learn anything about the identity of the sender.
Suppose that t participants decide to work together to determine the identity of
the sender. Here we can tolerate up to n−2 colluding participants: by pooling their
states and measuring, they will still remain uncertain as to who applies the phase
flip. To achieve the same in a DC-net, we require a fully-connected key-sharing
graph as noted in Section 6.3.1. Our protocol is therefore secure against all passive
attackers.
The fact that collusions do not affect the security of our protocol, also makes it
secure against the so-called predecessor attack described in [86]. In this attack, the
adversary is allowed to track a stream of communication over multiple rounds of the
protocol. Among the existing protocols investigated by these authors, only a fully
connected DC-net is resilient to this attack.
The most interesting property of our quantum protocol is that Alice can later
always deny she performed the phase flip. There is no record of her activity as
in the case of private shared random bits. Thus even if we have a collusion of
n− 1 participants, which together know all keys rij , they cannot prove Alice sent b
and not one of their own. This contrasts with all known classical protocols, where
once all keys become known to a single entity, it can always determine the sender
of a message. An outside entity, who has the ability to force all participants to
give up their keys, can trace Alice at any later point in time. The same is true in
computationally secure schemes, where public key encryption is used.
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Our protocol thus provides irreconstructible untraceability. Whereas this is
stronger than the classical protocols, it also makes our protocol more prone to dis-
ruptors. Unlike in the classical scenario, we cannot employ mechanisms such as traps
suggested by Chaum [28], and Waidner and Pfitzmann [84], to trace back disrup-
tors. If one of our participants is determined to disrupt the channel by, for example,
always applying a phase flip himself, we are never able to find and exclude him from
the network.
As indicated in our model description above, we assume that the participants
use at least a detectable broadcast channel. This is to ensure all honest participants
obtain the same value for an announcement. We have already described why this is
necessary to defeat active attackers in the context of a DC-net in Section 6.3.1. The
same argument also holds for our protocol.
7.4 Sending Qubits
We now extend the above protocol, to allow anonymous transmissions of qubits.
7.4.1 Anonymous Entanglement
Definition
To achieve this, we first allow two parties to create entanglement between them
without learning each other’s identity. We define
Definition 7.4.1 If two anonymous parties A and B share entanglement, we speak
of anonymous entanglement (AE).
Definition 7.4.2 If two parties A and B share entanglement, where one of them is
anonymous, we speak of one-sided anonymous entanglement (AE).
As we saw in Section 1.4.4, we can use shared entanglement together with clas-
sical communication to transmit information. An important property of quantum
teleportation using entangled states is that value of the classical bits which are
transmitted is independent of the state to be teleported. Anonymous entanglement
together with broadcast thus forms a virtual channel between two parties who do
not know who is sitting at the other end. This allows for easy sender and recipient
untraceability. We can create such channels directly by exchanging quantum in-
formation instead of, for example, changing the configuration of a hardware switch
as in the classical scenario. Classically, such a virtual channel would have to be
emulated by exchanging a key anonymously. Below, we give one example of using
anonymous entanglement. We think that the resource of anonymous entanglement,
however, could play a role in a variety of other protocols as well.
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Protocol
Since in our scenario all participants already share states |Ψ〉, we use the same
resource to establish anonymous entanglement for transmitting information. More
general protocols are certainly possible. Here the sending and receiving party can
establish entanglement between them anonymously using an idea presented in the
context of quantum broadcast [5]. We now assume that there are exactly two parties,
sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob), among the n participants interested in sharing an
EPR pair. If more parties are interested, they can use a form of collision detection
described later.
Protocol 4: AE
Prerequisite: Shared states (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2
1: Alice and Bob don’t do anything to their qubit.
All participants run ANON twice, where Alice’s and Bob’s input is always
0.
2: Participant j (of the n− 2 remaining participants):
- Applies a Hadamard transform to his qubit.
- Measures his qubit in the computational basis with outcome m.
- Runs ANON(m):
All participants run ANON, where the j’s input is m.
3: Bob applies a phase flip Z for every measurement result of 1 he receives.
At the end of the protocol Alice and Bob share the state (|00〉+|11〉)/√2. Because
ANON(b) from Section 7.3, does not reveal the sender of a bit b, no one obtains any
information about the identity of Alice. Likewise, all participants learn the outcomes
of all measurement results, so any of them could act as Bob does. Therefore the
“real” Bob also remains hidden.
7.4.2 Sending Qubits using Anonymous Entanglement
Alice and Bob can now use their shared EPR pair to send a qubit |φ〉 via quantum
teleportation [65], which we described in Section 1.4.4. We can thus construct the
following simple protocol to anonymously transmit a qubit, which uses this EPR
pair along with the above protocol ANON.
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Protocol 5: ANONQ(|φ〉)
Prerequisite: Shared states (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2
1: The participants run AE:
Alice and Bob then share |Ψ〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 anonymously.
2: Alice uses the quantum teleportation circuit with input |φ〉 and her half
of |Ψ〉:
- Obtains measurement outcomes m0,m1.
- Runs ANON(m0) and ANON(m1):
All participants perform ANON twice, where Alice’s inputs are m0
and m1.
3: Bob applies the transformation described by m0,m1 on his part of the
EPR pair to retrieve |φ〉.
As discussed earlier, AE and ANON(b) do not leak any information about Alice
or Bob. Since no additional information is revealed during the teleportation step, it
follows that ANONQ(|φ〉) does not leak any information either.
7.5 Dealing with multiple senders
So far we have assumed that only a single person is transmitting in any one round.
In reality, many users may wish to transmit simultaneously, leading to collisions. A
user can easily detect a collision, if it changes the classical outcome of the broadcast.
Depending on the application this may be sufficient. However, it may be desirable
to detect all types of collisions, even those that lead to the same broadcast outcome.
This could, for example, be important if we are also interested in the number of
outcomes of a certain type.
When transmitting quantum states, collisions are not so easy to detect. If more
than two parties wish to create entanglement between them using AE, they will
disrupt the transmission of a qubit using ANONQ later on. To solve this problem,
the participants can employ the same collision detection mechanism that was used
to regulate the transmission of classical bits.
7.5.1 Collision Detection
There is a simple quantum protocol to detect all kinds of collisions, provided that no
user tries to actively disrupt the protocol. We use the same resource, namely shared
entangled states |Ψ〉. The important part of this protocol is that it preserves the
property of our original protocol, namely that the sender cannot be reconstructed
at a later point in time.
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Protocol
Before each round of communication, the n participants run a dlog ne-round test
to check, whether a collision would occur. For this they require dlog ne additional
states of the form |Ψ〉 = (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2. Each such state is rotated before the start
of the collision detection protocol. Define
Uj = Rz(−pi/2j)⊗ I⊗n−1 = ei
pi
2j+1
(
1 0
0 e−ipi/2j
)
⊗ I⊗n−1
and map the jth state to |tj〉 = Uj |Ψ〉. This could for example be done by a dedicated
participant or be determined upon distribution of the entangled states |Ψ〉.
Protocol 6: Collision Detection
Prerequisite: dlog ne states |Ψ〉 = (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2
1: A designated player prepares dlog ne states by rotations:
For 1 ≤ j ≤ dlogne, he applies Rz(−pi/2j) to his part of one |Ψ〉 to create
|tj〉.
2: In round 1 ≤ j ≤ dlogne each of the n players
- Applies Rz(pi/2
j) to his part of the state |tj〉, if he wants to transmit.
- Applies a Hadamard transform to his part of the state.
- Measures in the computational basis.
- Announces his measurement result to all other players.
- Counts the total number of 1’s, kj , in the measurement results.
- If kj is odd, concludes a collision has occurred and the protocol ends.
3: If all kj are even, exactly 1 player wants to send.
Analysis
Correctness Let’s first take an informal look, why this works. In round j with
0 ≤ j ≤ dlogne, each user who wishes to send applies a rotation described by
Rz(pi/2
j) to his part of the state. Note that if exactly one user tries to send, this
simply rotates the global state back to the original state |Ψ〉 = (|0n〉+ |1n〉)/√2. If
k > 1 users try to send, we can detect the collision in round j such that k = 2jm+1
where m ∈ N is odd: First |tj〉 is rotated back to |Ψ〉 by the first of the k senders.
The state is then rotated further by an angle of (pi/2j) · 2jm = mpi. But
Rz(mpi) = e
−impi
2
(
1 0
0 empi
)
= ±i
(
1 0
0 −1
)
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applied to |Ψ〉 gives |Ψ′〉 = ±i(|0n〉 − |1n〉)/√2, where we can ignore the global
phase. The users now all apply a Hadamard transform to their part of the state
again, measure and broadcast their measurement results to all participants. As
before, they can distinguish between |Ψ〉 and |Ψ′〉, by counting the number of 1’s in
the outcome. If the number of users who want to transmit in round j is not of the
form 2jm+1, the players may observe an even or odd number of 1’s, thus they only
detect a collision with a certain probability.
The important observation is that in dlogne rounds, the players will obtain |Ψ′〉
at least once, if more than one user wants to send, which they can detect. If no
phase flip has been observed in all dlog ne rounds of the collision detection protocol,
the players can be sure there is exactly one sender. The key to understanding this
part of the protocol is the following observation:
Theorem 7.5.1 For any integer 1 < k ≤ n, there exist unique integers m and j,
with m odd and 0 ≤ j ≤ dlogne, such that k = 2jm+ 1.
Proof. By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic we can write k − 1 = 2jm for
unique j,m ∈ N where m is odd. We have j ≤ dlogne, since 1 < k ≤ n. Thus
k = 2jm+ 1. 2
Corollary 7.5.2 dlog ne rounds, using one state (|0n〉+|1n〉)/√2 each, are sufficient
to detect 2 ≤ k ≤ n senders within a group of n participants.
Proof. Using Theorem 7.5.1 we can write k = 2jm + 1 with 0 ≤ j ≤ dlogne.
In round j the final state will be Rz((2
jm) · (pi/2j))|Ψ〉 = Rz(mpi)|Ψ〉 = ±i(|0n〉 −
|1n〉)/√2, which the participants can detect. 2
The player who wanted to send then does so in a single round of anonymous
broadcast following this protocol. The protocol has the side effect that we can
also recognize the case of no senders. In the classical DC-net protocol, we cannot
distinguish between the sending of a 0 and no transmission. Here we will observe a
collision in the first round, if no senders are present. In the following we will speak
of one application of the collision detection protocol to denote all dlog ne rounds
necessary to perform collision detection.
Security Furthermore, this protocol preserves anonymity. We cannot determine
which player applied a certain rotation, since rotations by any player would result
in the same outcome. Thus this method does not leak any information concerning
the identity of a sender. All it reveals is a rough indication of the number of senders
present, which is what we were looking for. As before, this protocol is secure against
collusions against participants. Most importantly, it also preserves the repudiation
property of our original protocol: A participant is always able to deny sending later
on.
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7.5.2 Slot Reservation
The simplest way to deal with collisions is for the user to wait a random number
of rounds, before attempting to resend the bit. This method was suggested by
Chaum [28] and is generally known as ALOHA [79]. Unfortunately this approach is
rather wasteful, if many parties try to send simultaneously. Instead, we can use a
reservation map technique similar to what was suggested by Pfitzmann et al. [69].
For this we use n applications of collision detection (of dlog ne rounds each) to reserve
the following n slots: Each participant picks a round 1 ≤ r ≤ n to send in, which
he announces during collision detection. If no one else wanted to send, the player
then sends in round r following the reservation period. Otherwise he waits until
the next execution of slot reservation. Figure 7.1 illustrates this concept. Since all
participants are aware of the collision, the players can restrict the sending period to
only those rounds where no collision occurred earlier on. This restriction will ensure
that no sending rounds are performed unnecessarily.
Slot Reservation Sending Phase
Collision Detection
1 `
1 n2 . . . . . . . . . 1 n2 . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .. .
Figure 7.1: Slot Reservation with Collision Detection (` = log n)
Note that this does not protect us from disruptors who try to send in the rounds
following the reservation period. This allows them to successfully disrupt the pro-
tocol. However, the same is possible by measuring all qubits in the computational
basis, which destroys the resource required for transmissions. We are therefore not
concerned with this problem.
7.5.3 Using Collision Detection for Establishing Anonymous En-
tanglement
The protocol to establish anonymous entanglement relies on the fact that only two
parties refrain from measuring. We therefore require some coordination between
the two parties. In our scenario, we can make use of the same collision detection
protocol as we used to send classical bits. A simple approach would be to first run
collision detection protocol to determine the sender. The sender again expresses
his interest in indicating that he wants to send by employing rotations. We then
perform another application of collision detection for the receiver.
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7.5.4 Classical Collision Detection
Classically, we can perform a similar kind of collision detection using n2 log n bits
of private shared randomness. Instead of one bit of shared randomness, we now let
each two nodes i and j pool logn bits of shared randomness to obtain a log n-bit key
ri,j . Computations are now performed modulo n. We furthermore assume that all
parties have a unique (non private) id i ∈ [n]. As was also suggested by Pfitzmann
et al. [83] player i now computes
aj = bj +
n∑
k=1
sign(k − i)ri,k
and announces the result. During collision detection, player j just sets bj = 1 if he
intends to send. By calculating the total sum of all announcements, all players learn
how many participants intend to send. If there is only one sender, the total sum
will be 1. He then proceeds with sending in a single round of the original DC-net
protocol following collision detection. The same slot reservation techniques can be
employed.
Since we are again dealing with classical information, we can trace back the
sender at any later point in time, once we obtain all keys ri,j .
7.6 Resource Tradeoffs
By Theorem 6.3.5, one round in a DC-net requires at least Ω(n2) bits of private
shared randomness to be secure against collusions of any n − 2 participants. Our
protocol for transmitting classical bits, however, makes use of an n-qubit shared
entangled state |Ψ〉 to achieve the same. Interestingly, the entangled state is shared
equally by all participants, whereas each private key is known to only two parties.
The global entangled state cannot be used itself to create these private keys: By
measuring the state in the computational basis, the n players could distill one bit of
globally shared randomness. This common randomness cannot be used to establish
the private keys required by the DC-net protocol, since we allow all transmissions
to be monitored.
Our protocol for anonymous classical broadcast, requires each player to hold
exactly 1 qubit of a shared entangled state and to transmit 1 bit of information using
a broadcast channel. Without any form of shared resource the participants cannot
carry out a protocol for unconditionally secure anonymous transmissions. Likewise,
each player needs to communicate at least 1 bit of classical or quantum information
in each round. Since faster than light communication is impossible, he cannot apply
any modifications to his local quantum state which would transmit information to
the other players without additional transmissions. If, however, only the sending
player would transmit a bit, the other players could immediately be excluded from
the set of possible senders and the real sender cannot remain anonymous. Thus each
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sender needs to send at least 1 bit. We therefore believe that our protocol is close
to optimal.
7.7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a protocol for achieving anonymous transmissions using shared
quantum states together with a classical broadcast channel. The main feature of this
protocol is that, unlike all known classical protocols, it prevents later reconstruction
of the sender. This indicates that shared entangled states are very well suited to
achieve anonymity. Perhaps similar techniques could also play an important role in
other protocols where later reconstruction should be prevented.
Our protocol is a first attempt at providing anonymous transmissions with this
particular property. More efficient protocols may be possible. Perhaps a different
form of quantum resource gives an additional advantage. However, we believe that
our protocol is close to optimal for the given resources. We have also not considered
the possibility of allowing quantum communication between the participants, which
could be required by more efficient protocols. It is also open whether a better form
of collision detection and protection against malicious disruptors is possible. Using
shared entangled states, it is always possible for a malicious user to measure his
qubit in the computational basis to make further transmissions impossible.
Another issue arises in terms of state distribution. So far, we have simply as-
sumed that the participants share a certain quantum resource. In reality, however,
this resource would need to be established before it can be used. This would almost
certainly require quantum communication between the participants in order to dis-
tribute and test the necessary states. The original DC-net protocol suffers from a
similar problem: Unless the participants are supplied with private shared random-
ness initially or let a trusted third party distribute it, they have to establish these
keys later on. This, however, is impossible to do from scratch using only classical
channels [20]. Quantum states on the other hand have the interesting property that
the participants can create and test the states among themselves, instead of relying
on a trusted third party.
Appendix A
Linear Algebra
Quantum mechanics expressed using the Dirac notation makes heavy use of linear
algebra. We therefore provide a quick overview over the most important concepts
necessary for the understanding of this text. We assume the reader is familiar with
basic concepts, such as matrix multiplication and addition. A more detailed overview
of linear algebra can be found in any text book such as [7].
A.1 Vector Space
A d-dimensional vector space V is a set of all d-dimensional vectors closed under vec-
tor addition and scalar multiplication. We use V = Cd to denote the d-dimensional
complex vector space. In general V is a vector space over a field F , if the following
conditions hold for all elements X,Y, Z ∈ V and any scalars r, s ∈ F :
• Commutativity: X + Y = Y +X.
• Associativity of vector addition: (X + Y ) + Z = X + (Y + Z).
• There exists an additive identity: X + 0 = 0 +X = X.
• There exists an additive inverse: X + (−X) = 0.
• Associativity of scalar multiplication: (rs)X = r(sX).
• Distributivity of scalar sums: (r + s)X = rX + sX.
• Distributivity of vector sums: r(X + Y ) = rX + sY .
• Scalar multiplication identity: 1X = X.
A.2 Basic Notions
A set of vectors v1, . . . , vd ∈ V is linearly independent if
∑d
i=1 aivi = 0 has only the
trivial solution in scalars ai. A basis of a d-dimensional vector space V is a set of
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linearly independent vectors v1, . . . , vd ∈ V , the basis vectors, such that any vector
u ∈ V can be written as a linear combination of basis vectors.
The transpose of a matrix A is written as AT and given by ATij = Aji, where Aij
denotes the entry of the matrix A at column i and row j. Similarly, the conjugate
transpose A† of A is of the form A†ij = A
∗
ji. The inverse of a square matrix is
denoted as A−1. We have that AA−1 = A−1A = I, where I is the identity matrix
with Iij = δij .
If there exists a vector v ∈ V with v 6= 0 such that Av = λv, we say that v
is an eigenvector of A and the scalar λ the corresponding eigenvalue. The set of
all eigenvectors corresponding to an eigvenvalue together with the 0 vector forms a
subspace of the underlying vector space and is referred to as eigenspace.
The inner product of two vectors u, v ∈ V is given by 〈u|v〉 = u∗v = ∑i u∗i vi.
The vector norm is given by ‖ v ‖ = √〈v|v〉. Two vectors u, v ∈ V such that
〈u|v〉 = 0 are orthogonal. If, in addition, ‖ u ‖ = ‖ v ‖ = 1 then they are also called
orthonormal. A Hilbert space is defined as a vector space V with an inner product
inducing a distance metric.
A.3 Unitary Matrix
A square matrix U is unitary if U−1 = U †. The following expressions are equivalent
• U is unitary
• U preserves inner product: ∀v∀w, 〈Uv|Uw〉 = 〈v|w〉
• U preserves norm: ∀v, ‖ Uv ‖ = ‖ v ‖
A.4 Hermitian Matrix
A square matrix H is hermitian if is it self-adjoint, that is H = H †. In terms of
matrix elements of H that means that Hij = H
∗
ji.
A.5 Tensor Product
The tensor product of an m× n-matrix A and an m′ × n′ matrix B is given by the
mm′ × nn′-matrix
A⊗B =


A11B . . . A1nB
A21B . . . A2nB
. . .
An1B . . . AnnB

 .
The following properties hold for all A,B ∈ V and scalars c ∈ F :
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• c(A⊗B) = (cA)⊗B = A⊗ (cB)
• (A⊗B)† = A† ⊗B†
• A⊗ (B + C) = (A⊗B) + (A⊗ C)
• A⊗ (B ⊗ C) = (A⊗B)⊗ C
• (A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = (AC)⊗ (BD)
The tensor product is also defined for two vector spaces V and V ′. In particular, if
the basis of the d-dimensional vector space V is given by {v1, . . . , vd} and the basis
of the d′-dimensional vector space V ′ is given by {v′1, . . . , v′d′}, then V ⊗ V ′ denotes
the d · d′-dimensional vector space W with basis {vi ⊗ v′j |1 ≤ i ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ d′}.
Applying linear operators A to V and B to V ′ corresponds to applying A⊗B to W .
A.6 Trace
The trace of a matrix A is given by the sum of its diagonal entries tr(A) =
∑
iAii.
Note that
• tr(A+B) = tr(A) + tr(B)
• tr(AB) = tr(BA)
• tr(A) is the sum of the eigenvalues of A
In particular, when calculating the trace of a density matrix from Section 1.3.5, note
that
• tr(ρ) = tr(∑i pi|ψi〉〈ψi|) =∑i pitr(|ψi〉〈ψi|) =∑i pi〈ψi|ψi〉
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Abstract
Quantum Computation not only allows for more efficient local computations, but
also has far reaching effects on multi-party protocols. In this thesis, we investigate
two cryptographic primitives for privacy protection: private information retrieval
and anonymous transmissions.
The goal of private information retrieval (PIR) is to allow a user to retrieve any
item from a database while preventing the database from learning the identity of the
requested entry. We prove new lower bounds for the communication complexity of
unconditionally secure classical private information retrieval using a novel quantum
trick. In particular we show that for a 2 server PIR with an n-bit database and t-bit
queries, where the user needs b bits from each of the two `-bit answers satisfies
t = Ω
(
n
2b
∑b
i=0
(
a
i
)
)
.
Our result implies that several known PIR schemes are close to optimal. Closely
related to the problem of private information retrieval are locally decodable codes
(LDC). These are error-correcting codes that allow efficient decoding of individual
bits from the codeword, without having to read all of it. This is particularly useful in
applications where we wish to encode a large chunk of data, but are only interested
in extracting small pieces at a time. Imagine for example we want to encode an
entire book, but want to retrieve only a single page. We show that a 2 query LDC
encoding n-bit strings over an `-bit alphabet, where the decoder uses only b bits of
each queried position, needs code length
m = exp
(
Ω
(
n
2b
∑b
i=0
(
a
i
)
))
.
These results generalize those of Goldreich et al. [47], who proved roughly the same
bounds for only linear LDCs and PIRs. Like earlier work by Kerenidis and de
Wolf [53], our classical lower bounds are proved using quantum computational tech-
niques. The new trick used here is a tight analysis of how well a 2-input function
can be computed from a quantum superposition of both inputs.
We also study the problem of anonymous transmissions. In this setting members
of a group of participants want to send and receive data, without revealing their
97
identity to any other participant or an outside observer. We present a quantum
protocol for sending and receiving classical bits anonymously, which is resistant to
collusions of participants and, unlike all known classical protocols, prevents later
reconstruction of the sender. It appears that entangled quantum states are uniquely
suited for anonymous transmissions. We then extend this protocol to provide sender
and recipient untraceability for qubits as well. In the process we also introduce a
new primitive called anonymous entanglement, which may be useful for many other
protocols. Our protocol furthermore provides an example where O(k2) pairwise
private shared random bits can be replaced by a k-qubit shared entangled state. This
is an interesting tradeoff, as the k-qubit entangled state is equally shared by everyone,
whereas the classical random bits are shared only by each pair of participants and
are unknown to the rest.
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